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This paper defines and compares two models for 
the provision of early childhood education and 
care (ECEC) services: the market model, which 
is currently spreading and receiving increasing 
policy attention; and the model of democratic 
experimentalism, which has a low policy pro-
file, though examples are given of where this 
model has been proposed or implemented. 
These are not the only models available, and 
the intention is not to prove that one model is 
objectively better than all others; that would 
not be possible. Rather the intention is to resist 
the hegemonic tendency of the market model, 
by arguing it is neither necessary nor inevitable; 
and to move discussion of ECEC services from 
technical to political and ethical questions by 
demonstrating that there are alternatives and, 
therefore, the need for democratic decision-
making between these alternatives.
The first part of the paper is about the market 
model, based on a relationship of trade or 
exchange between two individuals, a purchaser 
and a provider. The model is an expression of 
neoliberalism’s deepest values, assumptions and 
beliefs, and these are summarised. The paper 
describes the spread of this model, in particular 
in three countries (Australia, England and 
the Netherlands), considers its meaning and 
rationale, and examines the evidence (from 
both ECEC and schooling) of how the market 
model works in practice. A central argument 
is that the market model is based on certain 
understandings or social constructions about 
people and services that are contestable and 
also to which people seem reluctant to conform. 
In particular, neither parents nor practition-
ers willingly adopt the role ascribed to them 
in the market model of Homo economicus, an 
autonomous and rational utility maximiser in 
pursuit of self-interest. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that for certain services many people 
are ambivalent about the market model, reject-
ing the trend towards treating everyone as 
‘consumers’, seeing public services as different 
from the market-place and valuing their ‘pub-
licness’. Creating perfect, or even good enough, 
conditions for a well-functioning ECEC market 
is obviously problematic and, almost certainly, 
yet to be achieved. 
The second part of the paper focuses on an 
alternative model for the provision of ECEC 
services: democratic experimentalism, a term 
drawn from the work of the Brazilian social 
theorist, Roberto Unger. Key terms – ‘democ-
racy’ and ‘experimentalism’ – are defined. 
Democracy involves formal systems of 
government, but it is also about relationships 
and everyday practice; in Dewey’s words, 
democracy is “primarily a mode of associated 
living embedded in the culture and social 
relationships of everyday life” (Dewey 1939: 2). 
Experimentation is about bringing something 
new to life, whether that something is a 
thought, knowledge, a service or a tangible 
product; like democracy, experimentation can 
have its more formal side, but it also represents 
Executive summary
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a way of living and relating that is open-ended 
(avoiding closure), open-minded (welcoming 
the unexpected) and open-hearted (valuing 
difference). This model is inscribed with differ-
ent understandings, concepts, goals and values, 
compared to the market model. For example, 
early childhood services are understood as 
public responsibilities, places of encounter 
between citizens, children and adults, and as 
collaborative workshops, capable of many 
purposes and projects; in the market model, 
they are understood as factories for producing 
predetermined outcomes and as businesses. The 
model of democratic experimentalism is based 
on values of participation, dialogue, trust and 
choice; ‘choice’ figures as an important value 
in both models, but whereas the market model 
values individual consumer choice, democratic 
experimentalism values collective choice or 
decision-making. 
Attention is paid to what democratic experi-
mentalism might mean at different levels, from 
the national to the local to the individual ECEC 
service: what are the roles of national and local 
governments and how might a nursery practice 
democratic experimentalism? Consideration is 
also given to the conditions needed to nurture 
and support democratic experimentalism, 
including: understandings, values, tools, 
an educated workforce, research and time. 
Although democratic experimentalism is less 
familiar today than the market model, examples 
do exist of where it has been proposed or 
implemented, and some of these examples are 
presented (though the process of exemplifica-
tion, and more generally the ability to evaluate 
democratic experimentalism and understand 
its potential, is hampered by the lack of system-
atic attention paid to this model in policy or 
research). 
Finally the paper compares what the two 
models might mean for how ECEC systems are 
structured, covering areas such as access, type 
of service, management, workforce and fund-
ing. For example, the market model favours 
demand-side funding of parent-consumers, 
while the model of democratic experimentalism 
requires supply-side funding representing the 
shared responsibility for children of communi-
ties and parents.
The paper concludes by arguing for the need 
for democratic societies to value and promote 
alternatives and that, in reality, models are 
never as pure or distinct as on paper, with 
variants and overlaps. But even taking account 
of this, real differences remain and real choices 
need to be made. More attention needs to be 
paid to defining different policy directions 
in ECEC and to the conditions that might be 
needed to follow them. 
1“Any vision of education that takes democ-
racy seriously cannot but be at odds with 
educational reforms which espouse the lan-
guage and values of market forces and treat 
education as a commodity to be purchased 
and consumed.  …  ‘Freedom of choice’ will 
be a major principle in determining educa-
tional policy, [but] the notion of ‘choice’ will 
not simply refer to the rights of individuals 
to pursue their narrow self-interests in a 
competitive marketplace. Instead it will be 
recognised that, in a democracy, individuals 
do not only express personal preferences; they 
also make public and collective choices related 
to the common good of their society.”
(Carr and Hartnett 1996: 192; emphasis added)
This paper is a contribution to democratic 
debate about an important field of service 
provision – early childhood education and care 
(ECEC) – though its argument applies in large 
measure to schools. There are different models 
of provision for ECEC services, including cen-
tralised state-run systems and the provision of 
services by workplaces. But today, a particular 
model is increasingly prevalent, spreading from 
the English-speaking liberal market economies 
into Continental Europe and beyond. In the 
‘market model’ provision is delivered through 
markets, in which consumers shop for and 
purchase services on offer from a variety of 
competing suppliers.
The paper attempts two tasks. First, to look at 
the market model for delivering ECEC services 
and what evidence there is about how it works 
in practice. Second, to outline another model, 
which is termed ‘democratic experimentalism’ 
(a term coined by Roberto Unger (2004), whose 
ideas I will discuss further). In doing so, I will 
compare these models across a number of 
fields: the different rationalities, values and 
understandings that underpin them; the impli-
cations of each for the structuring of service 
systems and the roles of different levels of 
government; and the conditions needed for 
these models to work well in their own terms.
My aim, to quote the title of an earlier paper 
(Moss 2007a), is to bring politics into ‘the 
nursery’, a term I use sometimes as shorthand 
for the whole of early childhood education and 
care, and to assert that ECEC is first and fore-
most a political and ethical undertaking, not 
a technical one. What do I mean? Drawing on 
Mouffe’s distinction, ‘politics’ can be under-
stood as practice: “[Politics is] an ensemble of 
practices, discourses and institutions which 
seek to establish order and organise human 
coexistence in conditions that are potentially 
conflictual … politics domesticates hostil-
ity”; while the ‘political’ can be understood as 
expressing and negotiating the conflictual in 
life, recognising a “dimension of antagonism 
inherent in human relations” (Mouffe 2000: 101). 
Though I would qualify Mouffe’s definition 
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2of the political with another view that the politi-
cal involves taking responsibility for that which 
is of common concern (Biesta 2004); the ‘politi-
cal’, therefore, might be said to encompass issues 
that are both of public interest and subject to 
disagreement, while by ‘ethical’ I refer to how 
we should practice our relationships to other 
people, other species and our environment. 
Technical practice (means, strategies and tech-
niques) is important, too; we can and should 
ask the technical question ‘what works?’ But 
this practice and this question should follow 
from and be subordinate to political and ethical 
practice, as well as to critical questions of a 
political and ethical nature. What is the purpose 
of early childhood education and care? What 
values and principles should it embody and 
promote? What is its image of the child, the 
parent, the early childhood worker, the early 
childhood service? What are the possibilities 
of ECEC and what are the dangers? What is our 
vision of the future? 
Speaking more specifically, I mean to continue 
in this paper an earlier exploration of how 
ECEC services can be places not just of political 
practice but, more specifically, of democratic 
political practice (Dahlberg and Moss 2005; 
Moss 2007a). For democracy to flourish, there 
needs to be a recognition and valuing of 
plurality, a view that there is more than one 
way to do things, more than one answer to 
every question, more than one perspective that 
needs to be brought into the debate. One of 
the problems with the market model discourse 
is that it has sought ‘hegemonic globalisation’, 
what Santos (2004) refers to as “the successful 
globalisation of a particular local and cultur-
ally specific discourse to the point that it makes 
universal truth claims and ‘localises’ all rival 
discourses” (p. 149). This is akin to Foucault’s 
concepts of ‘dominant discourses’ or ‘regimes 
of truth’. What this means in practice is that 
one perspective or one specific local practice 
comes to claim that it is the only truth and that 
there is no alternative: the more successful this 
hegemonic claim, the more its assumptions and 
values become invisible, its subjective claims are 
presented as objective truths, and it determines 
what is deemed self-evident and practical. Then, 
what is simply one view, one local discourse, one 
possible way for things to be, can come to seem 
universal and necessary, neutral and natural.
By bringing politics into the nursery, I want to 
‘denaturalise’ and ‘relativise’ the market model, 
in other words, to show that it is not neutral 
and neither a natural nor an inevitable process 
but instead just one alternative among many 
for providing ECEC services. I focus attention 
on one of the possible alternatives (democratic 
experimentalism), but I make no claim that 
this is the only one available. I have no wish to 
create a binary opposition, as if markets and 
democratic experimentalism were the only two 
models available to us. It is not a case of ‘either/
or’ – that we must go for ‘markets’ or ‘demo-
cratic experimentalism’ – but rather a case of 
‘and, and, and’, the possibility of several or even 
many alternatives.
Nor do I claim that one model is inherently and 
objectively better than the other. I will review 
3evidence – some of it critical – on how markets 
in ECEC work in practice. But basically I am 
dealing here with two views of the world that 
have very different rationalities, values, under-
standings and goals; different people, therefore, 
will come to different conclusions about which 
model is best, not on the basis of ‘what works’ 
or ‘evidence-based’ practice, but depending on 
their values, their understandings, and their 
views about the purposes of ECEC.
At heart, this is a paper about responsibility. 
My argument is that we – citizens of democratic 
societies – cannot escape responsibility for real 
choices that confront us in ECEC (and else-
where), by deferring to the invisible hand of the 
market or the truth claims of experts. There is 
no philosopher’s stone that, once discovered, 
will magically solve the dilemmas of public 
services, freeing us from the responsibility, 
uncertainty and anxiety of making difficult 
judgements and attempting complex activities. 
The questions facing us, which will not go 
away, is what shall we choose and how shall 
we choose?
The original version of this paper, prepared for 
and published by Bertelsmann Stiftung (Moss, 
2008a), was written in 2007, a time that in some 
respects seems an age away. It was before the 
current financial and economic crisis had 
broken across the world, when market momen-
tum seemed almost unstoppable, fuelled by an 
almost religious belief in markets’ infallibility 
(if left to their own devices), when few people 
outside the financial services industry had 
heard of credit derivatives or securitisation, 
when for most of us Lehman Brothers might 
as well have been a boy band for all we knew 
about investment banks. Today much has 
changed. While few would deny a role of some 
kind for markets, many more are asking what 
that role should be and under what conditions; 
markets are perhaps more readily seen as part 
of life, not a way of life. This, too, puts into 
contention the relationship between markets 
and the state, with the latter having to assume 
clear responsibility for the common good and 
rectifying some of the damage caused by the 
workings of the former. Some just hope to 
return to how things were in 2007, others are 
asking if this is either possible or desirable. The 
crisis then creates fear and deep insecurity, but 
it also opens up space for alternatives – it does a 
better job of denaturalising and relativising the 
market discourse than any number of discus-
sion papers!
The radically changed context is one obvious 
difference from the first version of this paper. 
Another difference concerns the content. I 
have developed or added a number of sections, 
saying more about: 
the relationship between the rise of the •	
market model and the rise of neoliberalism; 
the experience of the market model in •	
compulsory schooling;
the meanings of democracy and •	
experimentation, adding a new example of 
experimentation in ECEC; 
the distinction between ‘teaching citizenship’ •	
and ‘learning democracy’; 
the conditions needed for democratic •	
Introduction
experimentalism, including the role of 
research;
Roberto Unger’s ideas on democratic •	
experimentalism.
A final difference is in the title, which empha-
sises the theme of choice and responsibility, 
and is inspired by Unger’s observation that 
the “world suffers under a dictatorship of no 
alternatives. Although ideas all by themselves 
are powerless to overthrow this dictatorship, 
we cannot overthrow it without ideas” (Unger 
2005b: 1).
The paper is organised into nine sections, with 
two main parts. The first part is about the 
market model. The first section of this part 
charts the growing reach of the market model, 
with examples drawn in particular from Aus-
tralia, England and the Netherlands; the second 
explores the meaning of and rationale for this 
model, what it entails and the case made for 
it; the third reviews some evidence on how the 
market model works in practice. 
The second part of the paper is about an alter-
native model, what I term democratic experi-
mentalism. I devote more space to this than to 
the market model, partly because it will be less 
familiar to many readers. The first section of 
this part outlines the model of democratic exper-
imentalism, including its values, understand-
ings, concepts and goals. The second section 
presents some examples, to make the point 
that democratic experimentalism is not just 
an abstract model; we can learn from experi-
ence. The third section looks in detail at what 
this model might mean in practice at different 
levels, from national government to individual 
service. The final section in this part considers 
what conditions may be necessary for democratic 
experimentalism to take root and grow, just as 
the market model requires certain conditions to 
flourish.
In the penultimate section I contrast what the 
two models might mean for the way ECEC systems 
are structured, covering areas such as access, 
type of service, management, workforce and 
funding. The final section offers some con-
cluding reflections on how far the two models 
need be viewed as totally distinct and mutually 
exclusive opposites; it serves as a reminder of 
the diversity and messiness of the real world 
when compared with the modeller’s blueprints. 
However, even if differences are not necessarily 
so clear-cut in practice as in theory, the basic 
argument holds. There are different ways of 
thinking about, organising and practising 
ECEC, and choices need to be made – even if 
they are nuanced – in the process of democratic 
debate and negotiation. What is needed now is 
further work to support such debate and nego-
tiation, in particular articulating, researching, 
evaluating and experimenting with the different 
directions open to us. 
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5“The marketisation of early childhood 
services has been promoted in recent years 
in OECD countries. … To limit public 
expenditure, and allow greater choice and 
control by parents are among the reasons 
advanced. Vouchers and parent subsidies 
are favoured over direct funding of services 
in the expectation that parental purchase 
of services will bring private entrepreneurs, 
new funding and greater dynamism into the 
provision of services – all this with lesser 
cost to government.”
(OECD 2006: 115)
The growing reach of the market model
The appeal of market solutions for ECEC serv-
ices has been most apparent in the countries of 
the English-speaking world. These countries are 
often referred to as liberal market economies 
and have long been identified with what 
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) has termed a 
liberal welfare state, characterised by a narrowly 
defined role for the state and the encouragement 
of the market in the provision of welfare serv-
ices. ECEC services were slower to develop here 
than in many Continental European countries, 
and their rapid expansion over the last 15 to 
20 years has relied strongly on private, often 
for-profit (FP) providers. This expansion has 
also occurred in a context of resurgent liberal-
ism – economic neoliberalism and political 
advanced liberalism (Rose 1999) – supported 
by the growing influence of public choice and 
public management theories that have helped 
to depoliticise neoliberalism and market 
models, making them appear necessary, natural 
and neutral (Hay 2007).
But neoliberalism is intensely political: it is 
neither necessary, natural nor neutral but is the 
product of political process and choices. The 
market model is an expression of neoliberal-
ism’s deepest values, assumptions and beliefs. 
It is important, therefore, to understand these 
ideas in order to understand the rationale and 
process of marketisation.
Competition•	  is at the heart of neoliberalism: 
“Competition is central because it separates 
the sheep from the goats, the men from the 
boys, the fit from the unfit. It is supposed 
to allocate all resources, whether physical, 
natural, human or financial with the 
greatest possible efficiency” (George 1999: 3). 
Competition works through markets, “seen 
as the ideal mechanisms for the automatic 
co-ordination of the decisions of a multitude 
of individual actors in the best interests of 
all”. All kinds of practices – health, security, 
welfare and more – are being “restructured 
according to a particular image of the 
economic, the market” (Rose 1999: 146).
Individual •	 choice fuels competition and 
competition increases individual choice, 
involving finely calibrated calculations of 
Chapter 1: The market model
6preferences, costs and benefits to self and, 
perhaps, to the immediate family: “Modern 
individuals are not merely ‘free to choose’, 
but obliged to be free, to understand and 
enact their lives in terms of choice” (Rose 
1999: 87). 
Relationships of all kinds are reduced to •	
contractual relations between autonomous 
individuals. Everything in principle can be 
treated as a commodity and is therefore 
for sale, the ultimate criterion of value 
is monetary, and the individual is truly 
empowered by the market: “The market is 
presumed to work as an appropriate guide 
– an ethic – for all human actions” (Harvey 
2005: 165). 
Inequality•	  is both inevitable and beneficial, 
being the spur to competition.
Suspicion of democratic politics •	 is charact-
eristic of this model: markets are inhibited 
by politics and “governance by majority rule 
is seen as a potential threat to individual 
rights and constitutional liberties. … 
Neoliberals therefore tend to favour 
governance by experts and elites” (Harvey 
2005: 66). 
Suspicion of anything public,•	  which is 
defined as inherently inefficient and 
hindering competition, is also common. 
Public assets should be privatised, public 
spaces are either eliminated or increasingly 
colonised by private interests (most visibly, 
the remorseless spread of advertising and 
sponsorship), and private business solutions 
are preferred to public provision of goods 
and services. 
Hyper-individualism,•	  or privileging the self-
regulating and self-forming autonomous 
subject, is key, and was expressed by 
Margaret Thatcher in her famous 
statement that “there is no such thing as 
society”1. Collective action and public 
institutions undermine this autonomous 
subject (creating ‘dependency’) as well as 
obstructing the workings of the market, 
which should be constituted of individual 
agents with individual rights engaged in 
transactions unaffected by group interests or 
collusion. 
The social and the political collapse into •	
the economic and managerial: “All aspects 
of social behaviour are reconceptualised 
along economic lines” (Rose 1999: 141) and 
contentious issues are depoliticised and left 
to the market and management. 
A process of •	 repositivisation occurs to meet 
neoliberalism’s “rage for accountability”; it is 
based on measurability, meeting a reductive 
need for and belief in simplicity, certainty 
and objectivity, and on pinning its hopes on 
a “social science of variables” that claims an 
accurate, stable and ultimate representation 
of reality (Lather 2006: 784).
If these ideas are the drivers of marketisation, 
the consequences of this process for ECEC 
services can be most clearly seen in Australia 
and England. Until the early 1990s, ‘childcare’2 
1 Former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, talking to Women’s Own magazine, 31 October 1987
7in Australia was mainly provided by not-for-
profit (NFP) private providers. But policy 
changes between 1991 and 2000, mostly in fund-
ing, led to a rapid increase in services, together 
with FP providers, marketisation and corpo-
ratisation. Between 1991 and 2001, the number 
of places in FP ‘childcare’ services increased 
almost 400 percent compared to 55 percent in 
NFP services, and the disparate growth rate 
continued subsequently; by 2004, fewer than 30 
percent of children were in NFP services (Sum-
sion 2006). The first corporate ‘childcare’ busi-
ness floated on the Australian Stock Exchange 
in 2001, with three other companies following. 
One of these companies, ABC Learning, grew 
to become the largest ‘childcare’ business in 
the world today, a multinational corporation 
owning over 2300 centres in Australia, New 
Zealand, the US, Canada and the UK (Veevers 
2006) and valued in 2007 at AUS$ 2.9 billion (€ 
1.54 billion)3 (Bartholomeusz 2007).
This ambitious venture in globalised and 
corporatised ‘childcare’ has since come to grief. 
Shares in ABC Learning fell from February 2008 
when the scale of its debts first became appar-
ent, then the company went into receivership 
in November 2008, owing nearly AUS$ 1 billion 
(€ 531 million). The federal government in 
Australia has had to provide financial support 
to ensure the continued opening of nurseries 
providing for 100,000 Australian children, and 
various organisations are now looking to buy 
up nurseries sold off by the stricken company. 
It is difficult to judge the wider or longer-term 
significance of this particular experience with 
one company based in one country. No other 
FP provider comes anywhere close in size of 
operation or global spread, and ABC Learning 
can simply be written off as a maverick opera-
tion, unlikely to recur. Against this view, it can 
be treated as a warning of what marketisation is 
capable of producing, and therefore of the risks 
in a system combining markets and business 
and which cannot divorce itself from the wider 
economic context. ABC Learning illustrates 
how ownership can become over-concentrated, 
leading to potential abuse of dominant market 
positions (there have been accusations that 
ABC Learning used its position to put smaller 
competitors out of business) and the exposure 
of large numbers of children, families and 
workers to fallout from bad management. It 
also suggests that, as in banking, governments 
cannot allow large ‘childcare’ corporations to 
collapse, leading to the socialising of costs and 
the privatisation of profit.
The UK has seen similar rapid growth in a 
‘childcare’ market dominated by private FP 
providers, though without the emergence of 
The market model
2 I place ‘childcare’ in inverted commas to emphasise that this is a constructed concept or understanding of ECEC services; it is neither 
 self-evident nor neutral. Later in the paper, I explain the concept further and contrast it with other concepts. For a fuller discussion and  
 critique of the ‘childcare’ concept, see Moss (2006).
3 All currency conversions are for rates of exchange on April 3rd 2009, using Yahoo Currency Converter, <http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
 currency-converter?>
8any corporate giant such as ABC Learning. In 
1997 the private nursery sector was estimated to 
be worth £ 1.5 billion (€ 1.65 billion), rising to 
£ 3.5 billion (€ 3.84 billion) in 2006. The biggest 
growth was in corporate providers, with the 20 
largest owners between them providing nearly 
60,000 places (about 8 percent of total nursery 
places) (Blackburn 2007), including nearly 4000 
places run by Busy Bees, a chain of centres sold 
by a private equity company to ABC Learning 
at the end of 20064. The overall ‘childcare’ 
market, however, remains fragmented, certainly 
compared to what occurred in Australia. Nearly 
80 percent of the nursery sector in 2006 was 
accounted for by FP providers, divided almost 
equally between ‘sole traders’ (i.e. an owner with 
one nursery) and private companies; NFP and 
public providers each accounted for 11 percent. 
As in Australia, the growth of a market in 
‘childcare’ has been deliberate public policy in 
the UK, under both Conservative and Labour 
governments, supported by the introduction of 
demand-side funding arrangements (income-
related payments to parents) intended to 
underpin market growth by reducing ‘market 
failure’ arising from lower-income families 
being unable to access private providers. In 
England, the government’s Ten Year Strategy 
for Childcare, published in 2004 (HM Treasury 
2004), and the Childcare Act 2006 require local 
authorities to actively manage the market to 
secure sufficient childcare for working parents: 
“[L]ocal authorities take the strategic lead 
in their local childcare market, planning, 
supporting and commissioning childcare. 
… Local authorities will not be expected 
to provide childcare direct but will be 
expected to work with local private, volun-
tary and independent sector providers to 
meet local need.”          
           (Sure Start Unit 2006)
Recently, in its update of the Ten Year Strategy, 
the English Government commits to setting 
out “clearer expectations of Local Authorities’ 
duty to actively manage the market … [and to] 
reduce ‘market failure’ as far as possible” (HM 
Government 2009: 7). It is, the report asserts, 
“Governments’ job – both central and local – to 
provide strategic leadership through effective 
market management and accountability” (p. 11).
In some important respects ‘early education’ 
is treated differently from ‘childcare’, with an 
entitlement to free part-time provision for 
three- and four-year-olds, based on supply 
funding (i.e. direct to services). But provision 
of this service follows a market model; it can 
be supplied by any provider – public or private, 
school or nursery – meeting certain conditions, 
4 Busy Bees was one of three companies bought by ABC Learning at the end of 2006 for a total of US$522m in cash. The largest deal  
 was for the takeover of Chicago-based La Petite Academy from JPMorgan Partners, a financial services company, for $330m, making  
 the Australian group the second largest ‘childcare services group’ in the US, with over 1000 centres. Eddy Groves, the chief executive  
 of ABC learning, has said that the purchase of Busy Bees is “a starting point for further expansion into the fragmented UK market and  
 throughout Europe” (Veevers, 2006: 4); the collapse of the company has nullified this ambition.
9in return for which the supplier receives a nurs-
ery education grant. In 2008, 95 percent of three- 
and four-year-olds were attending free early 
education, but whereas the majority of four-
year-olds received their entitlement in schools, 
most three-year-olds received theirs in private 
provision, both FP and NFP (Department for 
Children, Schools and Families [England] 2008).
An active market policy has gained a foothold 
on Continental Europe, in the Netherlands. 
Recent legislation (Wet Kinderopvang, the 
Childcare Act), introduced in 2005, redirects 
funding from providers to parents, it replaces a 
supply-side funding system, operated by local 
government, with a demand-led childcare 
market (Lloyd 2008). The Act envisaged a 
‘tripartite’ method of funding childcare, 
shared between central government, parents 
and employers. Employers were expected to 
pay a third of costs, leaving parents to pay the 
remainder, although most parents received 
an income-related payment from the state 
in the form of a tax credit. However, because 
voluntary payments by employers fell short of 
government expectations, employment contri-
butions are now compulsory, through adding a 
supplement to existing unemployment premi-
ums paid by all employers.
“The explicit objectives of this [2005] reform 
are to increase parental choice and stimulate 
the operation of market forces” (Marangos 
and Plantenga 2006: 18), through the change in 
funding regime and substantial deregulation. 
One result has been a growing market share 
for FP providers, from an already high level; in 
2004, about 60 percent of childcare organisa-
tions had FP status (Noailly, Visser and Grout 
2007). The reform also brought informal carers 
such as grandparents into the system, including 
payment, but this has led to rocketing costs and 
changes to be introduced in 2011, which will 
impose new conditions and reduce funding for 
informal care (Lloyd 2008).
While both England and the Netherlands have 
adopted an explicit market approach to the 
provision of ECEC services, there are some 
national variations in practice, most notably: 
more employer involvement in contributing to 
costs in the Netherlands5 and a stronger regula-
tory role for government in England, with 
services subject to inspection by a national 
agency against national standards, as well 
as direct government investment to develop 
services in economically disadvantaged areas.  
(However, this investment is short-term, all 
services being expected in the long term to 
succeed unaided in the market.)
A final example of the Continental spread of 
marketisation is Flanders, the Dutch-speaking 
part of Belgium bordering the Netherlands. 
The market model
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 tax relief measures, and that employers in 2006 accounted for 18 percent of total market income; this compares to 71 percent of income  
 from parent fees or £2.5 billion. By comparison, demand subsidies to parents, in the form of tax credits, amounted to £360 million – or  
 10 percent of total market income (Blackburn, 2007).
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In recent years, a publicly funded system of 
nurseries has been first supplemented and now 
overtaken by a burgeoning private and unsub-
sidised sector, dependent on parental fees. 
Between 2000 and 2007, according to the annual 
reports of Kind & Gezin (the agency responsi-
ble for regulating childcare services), the former 
provision grew some 13 percent, from 13,652 
to 15,438 places; but over the same period the 
number of entirely private centres grew by 60 
percent, from 15,064 to 24,137.
The market model: Meaning and 
rationale
What is behind this growing policy interest 
in market solutions to the delivery of ECEC? 
What is meant by a ‘market model? What are 
the assumptions, values and understandings 
on which it is based? What are the attractions 
of the approach? Mostly the answers are of 
general applicability, not just specific to ECEC. 
They constitute a mindset, a way of seeing and 
understanding the world, people and the rela-
tionships between them.
As already noted, the market model is a product 
of neoliberal thinking and the growing influence 
of this type of capitalism (sometimes, in fact, 
called ‘market capitalism’) since the 1970s. The 
market model of ECEC is inscribed with the 
thinking of neoliberalism, which constructs a 
particular understanding of the world we live in 
and the people who populate it. In particular, 
this thinking divides people into ‘purchasers’ 
(or ‘customers’) and ‘providers’ (or ‘sellers’), 
coming together in a market place to trade a 
commodity (for example, ‘childcare’). The pur-
chaser should have a degree of choice between 
competing providers and, having chosen, 
should enter into a direct contractual relation-
ship, in which the chosen provider supplies a 
commodity – goods or services – to an agreed 
specification and price. Since purchasing power 
is unlikely to be equal, the market is supposed 
to produce goods of varying cost and quality, 
which can be matched to individual prefer-
ences and means; some purchasers will be able 
to pay for de luxe services, others must settle 
for economy models. The market, therefore, is 
a unique mechanism for creating a relationship 
between purchasers and providers, based on 
what has been termed an ‘exchange paradigm’: 
“The logic of the exchange paradigm requires 
an equal payment for each need-satisfying 
good” (Vaughan and Estola 2007: 246).
The case for the market, however, goes well 
beyond simply being a convenient means to 
match purchasers and providers. The market 
model, its advocates claim, is better able to: 
meet needs and preferences (choice); drive 
up standards (quality); provide best value for 
money (efficiency); protect consumers against 
the self-interest and overweening power of 
providers (empowerment); improve or close 
failing services (discipline); and stimulate new 
solutions to meet unmet and new consumer 
demands (innovation). 
“Those who favour demand-side funding 
[i.e. subsidising parents directly, rather 
than services] typically believe that markets 
work relatively well, that it is very important 
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to preserve parental choice over a range 
of childcare services, that parental choice 
will enforce competition between differ-
ent potential suppliers of childcare, that 
this competition will ensure that services 
are produced at the lowest possible cost 
for the quality chosen, and that suppliers 
will constantly seek to innovate in order 
to attract parental dollars. Most advocates 
for demand-side funding also believe that 
private for-profit suppliers will respond best 
to these market incentives.” 
               (Cleveland and Krashinsky 2004: 2–3)
Competition, as this quotation makes clear, is 
the force driving services to deliver these bene-
fits; alongside individual choice, competition is 
a central value of the market approach, since it 
supposedly ensures the allocation of resources 
with the greatest possible efficiency.
To achieve a competitive market that will 
produce what the consumer wants at the lowest 
possible price, certain conditions are assumed 
to be necessary: 
well-informed consumers•	  who know what 
they want and are willing to shop around 
for the best buy – i.e. “rewarding [childcare] 
providers who meet their expectations of 
quality at a price they can afford” (HM 
Treasury 2004: 47) – and, if subsequently 
dissatisfied, to switch their custom from one 
provider to another; 
sufficient supply,•	  both of individual services 
and of organisations supplying services to 
ensure choice and competition; 
subsidy for lower-income consumers•	  
(‘demand-side funding’) that will enable 
them to fully access the market; 
a ‘level playing field’,•	  so that all providers 
operate under the same constraints and 
conditions. 
There is, however, a more fundamental condi-
tion. The market model is based on certain 
understandings (or, put another way, images or 
social constructions) of people, relationships 
and institutions. It understands subjects (both 
the purchaser/consumer and the provider) 
to be competitive, profit-seeking agents, each 
making individual decisions about how best 
to maximise gain for themselves (and, in some 
cases, their immediate family). The image is 
economic man (Homo economicus), an autono-
mous and rational utility maximiser in pursuit 
of self-interest. This requires a very particular 
way of viewing the world; as individual con-
sumers “we see ourselves surrounded by a 
world in which everything is potentially a com-
modity for sale … the subject position on offer 
is the de-raced, de-classed and de-gendered 
‘possessive individual’” (Apple 2005: 16–17).
The actions and relationships of this subject are 
shaped by a calculative and economic rational-
ity, a process described by Nikolas Rose in his 
exploration of the newly dominant politics 
of advanced liberalism that complements the 
spread of marketisation:
“[As advanced liberalism develops,] the 
relation of the social and the economic is 
rethought. All aspects of social behaviour 
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are now reconceptualised along economic 
lines – as calculative actions undertaken 
through the universal human faculty of 
choice. Choice is to be seen as dependent 
upon a relative assessment of costs and ben-
efits of ‘investment’. … All manner of social 
undertakings – health, welfare, education, 
insurance – can be reconstrued in terms of 
their contribution to the development of 
human capital.      
            (Rose 1999: 141–142)
Within this market rationality, services are 
understood as producers and suppliers of a 
particular commodity and parents as potential 
consumers, or customers, calculating the best 
buy given their needs, preferences and what 
they can afford. The product for sale in the 
ECEC market is most often ‘childcare’ or, to be 
more precise, ‘quality childcare’6, representing 
the commodification and transfer to the market 
of a ‘household service’, formerly produced 
within the home by the unpaid work of women; 
other ‘household services’ that can similarly be 
commodified and marketised include cleaning, 
cooking and eldercare (Yeandle et al. 1999). The 
‘childcare’ service can, therefore, be understood 
as the producer of a commodity, supplied to the 
purchaser in exchange for her money. Today the 
commodity may well include not only a certain 
quantity of care delivered to a defined specifi-
cation but also certain predefined educational 
and developmental outcomes.
‘Childcare’ services that fail to meet their speci- 
fication and to deliver their advertised out-
comes, or that are unresponsive to changing 
consumer needs, will prove uncompetitive and 
be punished by parents-as-consumers who do 
not choose them in the first place or who, as 
dissatisfied customers, switch to other providers. 
According to the market model, therefore, 
‘childcare’ service must respond to market 
demands or close, and their users and staff 
move on elsewhere. 
This discussion of the market approach has 
assumed a dualistic relationship between pur-
chaser and provider. In practice, especially in 
fields where a public policy interest is identified, 
the state is highly likely to intervene to mediate 
market relationships. The result is what has 
been described as a ‘quasi-market’ (Whitty et al. 
1998), where the government controls such mat-
ters as entry by new providers, investment, the 
quality of service and price; it may even fund 
all or part of the cost of services, subsidising the 
service either directly or indirectly via transfers 
to purchasers. Here the state retains and sup-
ports the direct purchaser-provider relation-
ship, but steers the relationship indirectly and 
at a distance. Moreover, as the above comparison 
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6 The product can also be, as in the case of England, ‘early education’. Countries with strong market models often combine a market  
 model of ‘childcare’ with public programmes of targeted services intended to provide early intervention for a minority of ‘disadvantaged’  
 children (e.g. Head Start in the USA, Sure Start in the UK). The active role of the state, including supply funding of targeted services,  
 is justified in terms of the inability of the market by itself to respond to the needs of this group of families and the inability of the group  
 to access the market.
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of England and the Netherlands shows, markets 
can be mediated by government and others (e.g. 
employers) in different ways and to different 
degrees; the ‘market model’, therefore, should 
not be regarded as homogeneous.
Finally, it is important to make some distinc-
tions. The movement towards a market model 
may be accompanied by an increase in private 
provision, in particular services provided for 
profit, i.e. those run as businesses; the emer-
gence of corporatisation, i.e. services provided 
by public companies quoted on national stock 
exchanges; and the introduction or extension of 
demand-side funding, by which parents rather 
than services are subsidised, usually to enable 
their improved access as consumers to mar-
ketised services. These trends often coincide 
because the same rationality that values mar-
kets also values services provided as businesses 
and the funding of parent consumers rather 
than service suppliers. 
But the association is not inevitable or neces-
sary. Services that are directly publicly funded, 
even publicly run, can operate within a market 
or at least a ‘quasi-market’; for example, central 
or local government-funded schools may 
compete for pupils, both with each other and 
with private schools. Moreover, even a cursory 
look across Europe will show that ‘private pro-
viders’ of ECEC services come in many shapes 
and sizes, with varying histories and relation-
ships to the welfare state, some going back many 
years: national, regional and local NGOs, both 
secular and religious; local community groups; 
co-operatives; workplaces; and businesses, 
small, medium and large (Humblet 2006). So 
within a market-based model, the details can 
vary considerably, and ‘private providers’ need 
not be FP businesses or corporations.
How does the market work in practice?
There is, by now, a substantial literature on the 
relative merits of for-profit and not-for-profit 
ECEC services. Researchers “generally find 
that non-profit centres produce higher qual-
ity services” (Cleveland et al. 2007: 28). This is 
usually attributed to FP providers spending less 
on resources associated with quality, especially 
staffing: 
“[N]on-profits make different decisions 
about inputs (and appear to have higher 
quality objectives) than for-profits in child-
care. Non-profits consistently hire better-
trained staff, encourage them to [pursue] 
professional development and remunerate 
their staff better than FP centres. But, partly 
this greater production of quality appears to 
go beyond the different input decisions that 
non-profits make. Under the right condi-
tions, a culture of quality appears to develop 
in non-profit childcare organisations, pro-
ducing a quality level that is more than the 
sum of its parts. 
     (Cleveland et al. 2007: 17)
A study on the financial sustainability of private 
ECEC services in Flanders, published in 2004, 
documented that this marketised sector created 
especially low-quality jobs, in which very often 
the legislation on social security was bypassed. 
The market model
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It also documented high staff turnover, which 
can be a major risk for quality if qualifications 
are low (Misplon et al. 2004). While a study of 
the ‘childcare’ workforce in England, based on 
analyses of the Labour Force Survey for 
2001–2005, found that though pay overall was 
low, just over the minimum wage, it was con-
siderably lower in the FP sector at 72 percent of 
the level in the NFP and public sectors (Simon 
et al. 2008).
As already noted, studies comparing types of 
providers do not necessarily throw light on 
market approaches. Markets can operate in 
countries with very different mixes of provider 
types; Canada, for example, has fewer FP serv-
ices than Australia, the Netherlands and the 
UK. Cleveland et al. (2007) do, however, draw 
attention to one specific instance in Canada 
where there is a relationship between provider 
type and market functioning. In what they term 
‘thin’ markets (i.e. where there are relatively few 
children in an area), they find the difference 
between NFP and FP services disappears. They 
suggest:
“[I]n thin markets there is no opportunity 
for non-profits to produce and sell a dif-
ferentiated service – differentiated in higher 
quality. … In thin markets, there are not 
many parents with the demand and income 
to support higher-quality services. … In 
thick markets, there is a sufficient mass 
of geographically concentrated potential 
consumers to allow non-profits to aim for 
the higher quality end of the market (while 
commercial centres go for the lower end).”  
    (Cleveland et al. 2007: 15)
Focusing more specifically on the functioning 
of markets, Sumsion has described the primacy 
of market forces since the early 1990s in Aus-
tralian childcare, driven by government com-
mitment to “consumer choice, competitiveness, 
profit maximisation and a downsizing of 
government’s role in favour of private sector 
expansion … and the assumption that privati-
sation will enhance the efficiency of childcare 
provision” (2006: 101). However, as she goes on 
to note, there is a “lack of empirical evidence to 
support assertions about the ‘automatic supe-
riority’ (Crouch 2003: 9) of market-dominated 
provision of social services generally (Meagher 
2004) and childcare specifically”; and that “on 
the contrary, in Australia and internationally, 
evidence abounds of an ‘imperfect’ market 
for childcare services that fails to conform to 
the principles of so-called market rationality” 
(Sumsion 2006: 101).
As Sumsion’s reference to ‘imperfect’ markets 
implies, most evidence concerns how well mar-
kets actually work in practice. A recent study in 
England throws some light on what is termed 
the ‘supply side’, i.e. the supply of services to the 
market. The study, for the English Department 
of Education and Skills (DfES)7, is by the global 
accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
7 The Department’s remit has since been expanded, to include for instance child welfare, and it has been renamed the Department for  
 Children, Schools and Families.
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and is entitled Children’s services markets. The 
overall report begins by stating the government 
funder’s aim, highlighting the centrality of the 
market model in English policy: “The DfES 
wishes to develop an evidence-based strategy 
for developing the market in children’s services, 
which are identified as education, social care, 
health and other services for children, young 
people and families” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2006a: 3). Four separate reports follow, includ-
ing one on ‘childcare’.
Private providers, in the childcare study, voice 
concerns about the impact of publicly sup-
ported initiatives and services, including 
children’s centres and schools. There is a risk 
of provision closing due to what is perceived 
to be an uneven playing field producing unfair 
competition: “The feedback we gathered from 
the PVI [private, voluntary and independent] 
providers who have settings in areas exposed to 
a less favourable market environment suggests 
that increased local competition is a key factor, 
but some believe that additional local capacity 
in children’s centres and schools is having a 
significant impact” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2006b: 5). The resultant “losses may not discrim-
inate between high and low quality capacity 
(which) would hamper market development” 
(p. 6).
A second risk is inadequate supply of services 
for certain groups: “The capacity developed 
may not suit the nature of local demand, e.g. 
in areas where cultural factors impact demand 
for childcare; [and] a proportion of the market 
may remain underserved, e.g. working families 
unable to afford the full-cost childcare places” 
(p. 7). The overall report identifies a number of 
problems in markets for children’s services in 
general, including: local authorities not having 
“a strong sense of what the vision for their local 
market could, or should, be”; local authorities’ 
difficulty in managing markets; and uneven 
playing fields between public and private pro-
viders (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006a: 5–7).
A well-functioning market also involves a 
demand side – that is, the way consumers 
relate to the market; in particular, it requires 
an informed consumer who is willing and able 
to act as Homo economicus. ‘Consumers’ need 
information about price and quality and to 
process that information efficiently, to calculate 
‘best value’, to make initial choices and then to 
monitor those choices once made, all the time 
against the criterion of what is in their own 
(and perhaps their family’s) best interests. But, 
in practice, this perfectly honed calculation may 
prove hard to achieve. 
Homo economicus has been the subject of 
increasing scepticism as a basis for predicting 
how people will behave. In particular, the work 
of a new generation of behavioural economists, 
who apply the psychology of human behaviour 
to micro-economic decisions, has cast doubt on 
the existence of the ‘species’: “It is no longer axi-
omatic that the majority of people, the majority 
of the time, can be assumed to make choices 
that are unambiguously in their best interests. 
… The mystery isn’t why we make so many 
poor economic choices, but why we persist in 
accepting economic theory that predicts we 
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are biased toward making good ones” (Hutton 
and Schneider 2008: 16). As a British newspaper 
columnist observed, the work of behavioural 
economists has led to the “blindingly obvious 
discovery that economists’ reductionist view of 
humans as rational economic units is nonsense: 
people’s motivations are just as often not 
financially motivated, which explains why 
economists are not very good at predicting even 
tomorrow’s stock market movement, let alone 
the next crash” (Toynbee 2008).
Market-based ECEC services provide some evi-
dence supporting this sceptical view. Canadian 
researchers observe that “many parents have 
never purchased childcare before, and by the 
time they learn what they need to know, their 
children are old enough so that the parents 
may never purchase childcare again”. Further-
more, working parents have “little time to seek 
out and evaluate childcare, even if they knew 
entirely what they were looking for” (Cleveland 
and Krashinsky 2002: 39). The same researchers, 
with colleagues, develop this argument further 
in a critique of voucher schemes – one form of 
‘demand subsidy’ intended to enhance parental 
choice. Unless the use of vouchers is limited to 
services meeting stringent conditions, which 
will reduce choice, then vouchers may have 
deleterious consequences for children:
“While parents are generally very good 
judges of the needs and characteristics of 
their children, it is difficult to judge the 
child-development characteristics of care 
situations. And, because quality is difficult 
to judge, childcare providers, particularly 
those offering on a commercial basis, gener-
ally have incentives to claim higher quality 
than they do in fact deliver (Walker 1992). 
So, while vouchers will encourage parents to 
spend more on childcare, and while they do 
offer parental choice, they are not a particu-
larly good way to ensure that high-quality 
childcare is both more affordable and more 
widely used.” 
     (Cleveland et al. 2008: 29)
The English Government’s key ‘childcare strat-
egy’ document concedes similar problems: 
Although the quality of childcare experience 
is vital to child outcomes, there is evidence 
to suggest that parents do not accurately 
observe the quality of the childcare they use. 
… [A recent American study] suggested that 
parents significantly overestimate quality; 
do not use all available information when 
judging quality; and incorrectly believe that 
certain observable characteristics are indica-
tive of non-observable quality.” 
       (HM Treasury 2004: 67) 
Experience in the Netherlands confirms that:
“[I]nformation is a real problem. The 
consumers [assumed to be parents] do not 
know every supplier and quite often receive 
information through informal networks. 
Furthermore the consumer is only partly 
able to check the quality of services. … As 
a form of self-regulation, the sector has 
adopted a quality agreement with rules 
about a pedagogical plan, child–staff ratios, 
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group size and accommodation. Parents, 
though, seem to value different aspects of 
quality, for example active play, the provision 
of different activities and short journeys. As 
a result, parents may overestimate a service’s 
quality. … Parents also appear to have little 
knowledge of the cost of childcare.” 
     (Marangos and Plantenga 2006: 19) 
Another Dutch report sums up the problem: 
“Parents and government simply cannot be 
present full-time while the service is being 
rendered and therefore a residual informational 
deficit or asymmetry will remain” (Noailly et al. 
2007: 23).
Cleveland and Krashinsky raise a further 
complication about the consumer’s role in the 
‘childcare’ (or ‘early education’) market. Who is 
the consumer for these services? Most studies of 
and advocates for the market assume parents are 
the primary consumers. But, arguably, children 
are the direct consumers, with most first-hand 
experience of the commodity sold on the 
market, and they “cannot easily communicate 
with the parent about what kind of care is being 
delivered” (Cleveland and Krashinsky 2002: 39). 
They are also unlikely to have a strong voice in 
the original choice of service; indeed, they have 
no recognised place in the exchange transaction 
– reference to children’s rights is noticeably 
absent in the market model. For example, the 
report of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006a) for 
the English Government on children’s services 
markets makes no reference to children’s rights, 
children’s participation or children’s perspectives.
But there is an even more central problem of 
the market model, at least for ECEC and similar 
human services. Many people are reluctant 
to adopt the mantle of ‘consumer’ and are, 
indeed, ambivalent about the model and its 
premises. In a study of English public services, 
part of the joint Economic and Social Research 
Council and Arts and Humanities Research 
Council Cultures of Consumption programme, 
John Clarke found most people reject the trend 
towards treating everyone as ‘consumers’, seeing 
public services as different from the market-
place and valuing their ‘publicness’:
“The idea that people expect to be treated 
as consumers by public services has become 
a central theme in public service reform 
under New Labour [i.e. the post-1997 UK 
Government]. … [Our research] found that 
people have many relationships with public 
services. They are citizens, experts, taxpay-
ers and voters as well as users, and they 
see themselves as part of wider bodies – as 
members of the public or local communi-
ties. When people approach health, police 
or social agencies, they do not always know 
what they want. They hope to meet staff 
who will respect them and help them make 
important decisions. … Our findings show 
that both providers and users consistently 
view public services as different from com-
mercial transactions, insisting that the process 
is ‘not like shopping’. … This phrase was used 
repeatedly in the interviews. It captures the 
view of the people we met that public serv-
ices are, and should be, centred on ongoing, 
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personal relationships, rather than being 
anonymous, one-off transactions.” 
            (Clarke 2006; emphasis added)
Elsewhere, Clarke argues that “the key to 
unlocking public service improvement may lie 
in a deepening understanding of the relation-
ship between service and user, rather than the 
blunt instrument of choice” (Clarke, quoted in 
Coleman 2006: 30).
Further evidence that using human services is 
not necessarily to be equated with shopping 
comes from the ECEC field. Consumers may 
switch between suppliers of mortgages or of 
privatised utilities such as electricity or gas. But 
when it comes to ‘childcare’, parents prove more 
reluctant to switch their custom. 
“According to recent research, over half 
of [Dutch] parents had never considered 
changing to another provider. Only 5 
percent actually did so in 2004. Childcare is 
not like a supermarket product: the rela-
tionship between consumer and provider 
is personal and long term. A double loyalty 
exists: to the childcare organisation, but 
also – and mainly – to their children. The 
longer childcare is used, the more familiar 
and safe parents and children feel and the 
more personal contact they have with staff 
and the other children and parents. In these 
circumstances, a price increase or a (small) 
change in opening hours will not generate 
much change in demand.” 
     (Marangos and Plantenga 2006: 19)
Not only may there be resistance to adopting 
the identity of consumer and the vision of 
the market, but there remains attachment to 
non-market values, such as loyalty, security and 
affective relationships. 
That childcare markets do not work as markets 
are meant to because parents do not subscribe 
to the necessary roles and rules is also the 
conclusion of a study of middle-class parents 
in two areas of London, the most substantial 
research to date on the actual workings of 
childcare markets. Ball and Vincent (2006) 
describe the ‘childcare’ market as it actually 
functions as a ‘peculiar market’, for seven 
reasons. Given the uniqueness of this study, it 
is worth considering these reasons at greater 
length:
“The childcare market just does not work 1.	
like markets are supposed to. As a practical 
market it is very different from a market in 
theory – and indeed it is a very inefficient 
market” (p. 38).
“The services which are required by 2.	
consumers are complex and unusual. As 
our respondents unanimously see it, they 
want ‘safety, happiness and love’. … This 
is in a sense an impossible market. The 
financial exchange is inadequate as a way of 
representing the relationship involved” (p. 38).
The market is “saturated with emotions”. 3.	
“[Our data] are infused with the language 
of emotions” and “both positive choices and 
rejections are based on a mix of rational 
and emotional criteria … and typically 
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determined by what is described as ‘gut 
instinct’” (pp. 38–40).
“There is little evidence of consumer 4.	
sovereignty in these local London markets, 
partly because of shortages on the supply 
side, and partly because the consumer is in a 
position of relative ignorance” (p. 40).
“This is a highly gendered market. The main 5.	
players in both supply and demand are 
women … most literature on marketisation 
is silent on gender and also on the role 
of emotions. Again this challenges the 
traditional economic assumptions about 
the theoretical consumer. As Kenway 
and Epstein (1996: 307) suggest, ‘the free 
standing and hyper-rational, unencumbered 
competitive individual who can operate in 
the morally superior market can only be an 
image of middle-class maleness’” (p. 43).
“This is currently a highly segmented and 6.	
diverse market, with very many different 
types of providers, both public and private. 
… [T]he providers are clearly aware of 
themselves operating in a hierarchical, 
classed market … [which] also has a very 
highly developed ‘grey market’ sector – with 
many informal, unregistered, ‘cash-in-hand’ 
operators” (Ball and Vincent 2006: 44).
“Parts of [this market] position parents as 7.	
employers of individual service providers – 
nannies specifically – to work in their own 
homes. Again the relations of exchange are 
very complex, involving both personal/emo-
tional and formal/financial aspects” (p. 47).
Although this work points to a variety of 
problems with the market model in practice, 
including supply-side shortages and fragmenta-
tion, the heart of the matter is ambivalent or 
hostile attitudes to market rationality and its 
associated values and understandings. Nor is 
this confined to parents. Two studies, which 
together involved over 200 English ECEC prac-
titioners, found that “the New Labour Govern-
ment and its new managerialist emphasis on 
competitive individualism … ran counter to 
the views and experiences of participants in 
both studies” (Osgood 2004: 10). Practitioners 
emphasised caring, collaboration and commu-
nity, values that were perceived to be at odds 
with, and at risk from, reforms that emphasised 
competitive entrepreneurialism and favoured 
rationality, commercialism and measurability. 
Like Ball and Vincent, Osgood identified gender 
as an important influence: 
“[T]he ethic of care and approaches to 
management that female managers tend to 
adopt can be regarded as oppositional dis-
courses to the masculine managerialism … 
embedded in government policy designed to 
promote entrepreneurialism. … They were 
resistant to viewing children as financial 
commodities, but this became inevitable 
when seeking to make a profit.” 
         (Osgood 2004: 13, 16)
Ball and Vincent argue further that the current 
problems are irresolvable “in so far as there are 
important paradigmatic differences between 
the nature of market relations and the nature 
of the social relations embedded in childcare. 
… [T]he market is an exchange relationship 
rather than a shared relationship based on 
The market model
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shared values” (Ball and Vincent 2006: 48). 
Actual behaviour in childcare markets throws 
into question the market’s understanding of the 
subject as Homo economicus, an understanding 
further questioned by the research of Duncan 
and his colleagues into how people make deci-
sions about parenting, partnering and work:
“People seem to take such decisions with ref-
erence to moral and socially negotiated views 
about what behaviour is expected as right and 
proper, and that this negotiation, and the 
views that result, var[y] between particular 
social groups, neighbourhoods and welfare 
states. These decisions are not simply indi-
vidual, but are negotiated in a collective way. 
… Decisions are still made rationally, but with 
a different sort of rationality to that assumed 
by the conventional economic and legal model. 
… If people do not act according to the 
model of rational economic man and the 
rational legal subject, then legislation based 
on such assumptions might well be ineffec-
tual. This is what I have labelled the ‘ration-
ality mistake’.” 
    (Duncan 2000: 1–2; emphasis added)
The word ‘legislation’ might easily be substituted 
by ‘policy’ or ‘delivery model’ here.
Similar critiques have been offered of the mar-
ketisation of other human services. Writing from 
a feminist perspective and basing her critique on 
an ethics of care (Tronto 1993), Virginia Held 
seeks to define limits for markets.
“Areas such as healthcare, childcare, edu-
cation, the informing of citizens, and the 
production of culture could all be thought 
of as domains in which values other than 
economic gain [the ideal market norm] 
should be accorded priority. … [In these 
areas,] market norms limited only by rights 
should not prevail, even if the market is fair 
and efficient, because markets are unable to 
express and promote many values important 
to these practises, such as mutually shared 
caring concerns.” 
   (Held 2002: 29, 31; emphasis added)
Creating perfect, or even good enough, condi-
tions for a well-functioning ECEC market is 
obviously problematic and, almost certainly, 
yet to be achieved. Some of the problems seem 
more susceptible to improvement than others, 
with the central problem for the market model 
being the inability (or unwillingness) of parents 
and practitioners to assume the role of utility 
maximisers and to adopt the values required for 
effective market participation. There is also a 
certain contradiction in the current situation 
that market models offer parents choice – except 
the choice of not participating in markets8.
But the problems are not confined to getting 
markets to function well as markets. There is 
8 Another apparent contradiction is how neoliberalism combines professed values of choice and flexibility with a passion, in practice, 
 for control and standardisation (Davies and Saltmarsh 2007), applying a formidable battery of technologies for strong regulation of  
 services (Rose 1999). 
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also evidence, albeit patchy, that market systems 
are not yet able to deliver the results sought by 
government policies, in particular equal access 
to good quality services and sustainability of 
services. Whether this is a temporary setback 
due to short-term imperfections in the market 
or these are endemic problems in the market 
model is a matter of opinion.
I have already noted that supply of services 
may not be evenly spread, one of the reasons 
for problems of access reported in some studies 
in England. Ball and Vincent conclude that the 
childcare market does not “guarantee quality or 
efficiency and it dispenses services in a highly 
inequitable fashion” (2006: 48)9. One group 
not so well served by market models may be 
middle-income families. I have also noted the 
report on the English childcare market, which 
suggests “working families unable to afford the 
full cost childcare places” may be “underserved” 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006b, p. 7). Another 
English study, of several local areas, reported 
that in an affluent commuter area parents with 
higher incomes could keep prices high, thereby 
putting these services out of the reach of low- 
to middle-income parents (Harries et al. 2004). 
Other English studies suggest that access 
problems are also likely to affect children of 
disadvantaged parents, including black and 
minority ethnic parents (Kazimirski et al. 2006a, 
b). This may also be what the Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers report into childcare markets means 
when it concludes, somewhat opaquely, that 
“the capacity developed may not suit the nature 
of local demand, e.g. in areas where cultural 
factors impact demand for childcare” (Price-
waterhouseCoopers 2006b, p. 7). On the same 
theme, the major cross-national OECD thematic 
review of ECEC policies, covering 20 countries, 
notes that the “reluctance of market providers 
to invest in poor neighbourhoods incurs the 
risk of inequity towards low-income families” 
(OECD 2006: p. 117). This problem may be amel-
iorated through targeting extra resources either 
on low-income families or poor neighbour-
hoods. However, such targeted programmes:
“… miss not only a significant proportion 
of the children whom they are supposed to 
serve, but also the large group of moderate-
income families who are unable to afford the 
programmes that are on offer in a market 
system. In addition, targeting is generally 
inaccurate – that is, it does not respond to 
children who move in and out of risk.”  
                      (OECD 2006: 117) 
A Dutch study of the impact of the 2005 Child-
care Act concludes that since the introduction 
of more market forces, “provision of childcare 
in 2006 has shifted towards areas with higher 
purchasing power and away from less-urbanised 
areas” (Noailly et al. 2007: 18). The authors 
acknowledge that this might support concerns 
that the new legislation could lead to providers 
focusing on high income and more urban mar-
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kets, though they conclude that it is too soon to 
say if this is in fact the case. 
Another concern is quality. Without some 
form of public subsidy, quality may be variable, 
depending to a significant degree on the ability 
of parents to pay sufficient fees. But it may 
remain a problem even with some element of 
public funding, especially if demand-side fund-
ing (i.e. direct to parents) is used as the method 
most compatible with marketisation. The OECD 
Starting Strong review is generally critical of 
this funding method, on grounds that it fails to 
direct sufficient funding to support quality due 
especially to under-funding and inefficient use 
of funding. Its conclusion is clear:
“The evidence suggests that direct public 
funding of services brings more effective 
governmental steering of early childhood 
services, advantages of scale, better national 
quality, more effective training for educators 
and a higher degree of equity in access com-
pared with parent subsidy models.” 
      (OECD 2006: 14; emphasis added)
Similar issues about quality in marketised 
ECEC services with a demand-side funding 
base are highlighted in national studies. Access 
to services in the Netherlands appears easier 
than in the UK; a study there found most 
parents have several choices available, though 
nearly a third of parents with children under 
four years old had no choice and the choice 
was more restricted in rural than urban areas 
(Marangos and Plantenga 2006). There are, 
however, concerns about the impact on qual-
ity of recent moves towards a lightly regulated 
market; standards appear to have been falling 
even before the new childcare legislation was 
introduced in 2005 (Vermeer et al. 2005).
The English childcare strategy document 
expresses concerns about quality in the existing 
market, which it blames (indirectly) on parents 
and (directly) on failings in the market:
“Analysis of the operation of the UK child-
care market demonstrates that parents may 
undervalue quality, and trade it off against 
price. Findings from an Institute of Fiscal 
Studies analysis of the UK childcare market 
suggests that price is negatively related to 
quality, so that parents effectively compro-
mise on quality as childcare becomes more 
expensive [Duncan, Paull and Taylor 2001]. 
These studies would suggest that the child-
care market is not working to drive down 
price and drive up quality. This may indicate 
that parents do not have sufficient informa-
tion to be able to form a full judgement of 
the quality of care on offer.” 
       (HM Treasury 2004: 67)
This conclusion seems to suggest that if only 
parents knew how to behave as consumers, 
then they would extract better quality for less 
cost. Yet it is not immediately obvious how 
price can be driven down and quality driven 
up. There is much evidence to show that the 
workforce is the central determinant of qual-
ity, and that a well-qualified and properly paid 
workforce is important: “Research from many 
countries supports the view that quality in the 
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early childhood field requires adequate training 
and fair working conditions for staff” (OECD 
2006: 158). The Effective Provision of Pre-school 
Education study, a major longitudinal study of 
3000 English children, provides a clear example 
of this recurring finding, concluding unequivo-
cally that “settings which have staff with higher 
qualifications, especially with a good proportion 
of trained teachers on the staff, show higher 
quality and their children make more progress” 
(Sylva et al. 2003: 2). 
But as labour is the major cost for providers, 
there are already pressures in competitive 
markets to keep labour costs low, which in turn 
have an adverse effect on levels of qualification. 
Wages in the ‘childcare’ sector in England are 
low; averaged over the period 2001–2005, the 
average hourly pay for nursery workers was £ 5.95 
(€ 8.03), compared to £ 14.41 (€ 19.45) for primary 
school teachers and £ 8.53 (€ 11.51) for all women 
workers (Simon et al. 2008). So low indeed are 
wages that a rise in the national minimum wage 
(NMW) can cause concern to proprietors:
“Six out of ten respondents to the Nursery 
World [a UK practitioner magazine] 2006 
pay survey said they had been significantly 
affected by the previous autumn’s NMW 
increase. … Employers funded the increase, 
and consequential rises in rates for higher-
qualified staff, by raising fees (although 
some said this resulted in parents leaving) 
and by a combination of cutting staffing 
levels, running at minimum ratios, reduc-
ing staff ratios, reducing staff hours and 
employing younger, less well-qualified staff. 
The indirect effects of the NMW increase, 
said respondents, were a fall in staff morale, 
less interest in training, as staff perceive that 
the pay differentials do not justify the extra 
effort, and less money available for buying 
equipment.” 
     (Evans 2007: 10). 
The majority of manager respondents in 
Osgood’s study “described their inability to pay 
staff more than the minimum wage” (2004: 16). 
Morgan (2005), comparing the USA, France and 
Sweden, found poor pay and conditions were 
more entrenched where market forces were 
stronger.
The existing squeeze on workers’ pay in market 
systems seems to be compounded by means-
tested demand-side funding that is intended 
to enable lower-income families to participate. 
Such funding generally proves inadequate to 
ensure a well-educated and well-paid work-
force. As the final report of the OECD review 
of ECEC comments, “demand-side funding is, 
in general, under-funding and the burden of 
costs in market-led systems falls essentially 
on parents, who, in the market economies pay 
fees ranging from 35 percent to 100 percent of 
the costs of childcare, unless they belong to 
low-income groups” (OECD 2006: 116). Inad-
equate to begin with, parent subsidies may 
not be passed on fully to providers and they 
make it difficult for services to plan for the 
longer term. Of course, supply-side funding is 
no guarantee of good employment conditions 
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and demand-side funding might be designed 
to achieve better results. However, demand-
side funding tends to be associated with a view 
that ‘childcare’ services are essentially a private 
responsibility and cost (arising from the com-
modification of formerly private household 
work), with public funding consigned to the 
role of providing limited support for low-
income families; such an understanding is not 
conducive to funding that is sufficient to sup-
port a well-qualified and well-paid workforce 
and to provide well-developed pedagogical and 
professional supports. 
In sum, supporters of the market model argue 
that a well-functioning market will enable more 
parents to get better quality services through 
competition driving price down and quality up. 
The reality is that (a) quality is associated with 
the pay and qualification levels of the work-
force, and (b) workforce pay accounts for most 
of the costs of ‘childcare’. Driving down price 
through pressure on salaries or staffing ratios is 
more likely to lower quality, all the more so as 
the workforce in most market systems already 
experience low pay and are (compared, for 
example, to teachers) poorly qualified.
Two other problems can be identified in markets, 
as they currently operate. First, the imperative 
of competition can override the benefits of 
collaboration. Thus the private sector managers 
in Osgood’s studies “tended to take an insular 
and defensive view of their interests and were 
sceptical about sharing practices for fear of 
losing a competitive edge over other providers” 
(Osgood 2004: 16). Consequently, most did not 
participate in local networks and other group-
ings: one manager commented that “you’re 
all in competition with each other, so sitting 
on these things would be like liaising with the 
competition” (Osgood 2004: 16). The same ten-
sion between competition and collaboration is 
vividly displayed in this excerpt from an article 
by the chairman of a business that runs a chain 
of some 20 nurseries in England; responding 
to a government proposal that ‘best nurseries’ 
be expected to share ‘best practice’ with other 
nurseries, he points out the contradiction of 
such collaboration in a market system made up 
of nursery businesses:
“Imagine arriving at your supermarket and 
finding members of a rival brand advising 
on how best they should display their goods. 
… What has this to do with childcare? 
Well, this is exactly what the government 
is expecting the best nurseries to do in an 
effort to raise standards across the board. 
In the spirit of partnership working, both 
the private and maintained [public] sec-
tors will be expected to spend time sharing 
best practice[s] with other nurseries, even 
if they are competitors. … [To] ignore the 
commerciality [sic] of such a request to the 
private sector is simply not realistic. … Why 
should funds not be available to private 
companies that choose to offer ‘consultancy 
advice’? I would be willing to set up such 
a training support group within our com-
pany – but please, let such a scheme be both 
realistic and commercial.” 
               (Bentley 2008: 12)
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Second, there is some evidence of considerable 
instability among services in markets; a lot of 
services prove unsustainable and close. The 
evaluation of the English Neighbourhood 
Nursery initiative concluded that without 
substantial subsidy, nurseries in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods were not financially sustainable 
(Smith et al. 2007). But the problem is more 
general. Between 1999 and 2003 in England, 
the rate of childcare places closing was higher 
than government had expected: 626,000 new 
childcare places were created, mostly in ‘out-
of-school’ services, but 301,000 closed, with the 
closure rate particularly high among family day 
carers, where it exceeded new places (National 
Audit Office [UK] 2004). The private sector 
remains vulnerable in England; at the start of 
2007, the average vacancy rate was 22.5 percent, 
a doubling of the rate five years before, con-
firming that growth in nursery capacity has not 
been fully met by higher demand (Blackburn 
2007). Most recently, it has been reported that 
in England the number of providers is plum-
meting (Gaunt 2009).
Similar experiences, of high closure rates 
among private services, are reported in other 
countries. Between 2000 and 2006, according to 
the annual reports of the Kind & Gezin, 749 
new privately funded services opened in Flan-
ders, but 338 closed; in other words, for every 
two start-ups there was one closure. Prentice 
(2005) quotes research in Canada (British 
Columbia) showing that a third of centres 
operating in 1997 had closed by 2001, with FP 
services at much greater risk. In 2003–2004, in 
the province of Ontario, 349 centres opened, 
but 256 closed during the same year. 
Finally, there is not much evidence of innova-
tion in ‘childcare’ services in market systems, 
and what exists is limited to private centres 
offering specific programmes of instruction 
(e.g. English, information technology, music 
lessons) and ‘flexible places’, where children can 
attend for a few hours or sessions or even out-
side normal opening hours (OECD 2006). The 
emphasis here is on innovation as a response 
to individual consumer demands, in order to 
attract more business. By contrast, the examples 
cited later of experimentation in ECEC are all 
drawn from the public and non-profit private 
sector, and have evolved in non-market settings 
or else adopted a non-competitive approach. 
This does not prove that no such examples exist 
among FP services actively competing in mar-
kets; it does suggest that the alleged innovative 
nature of markets is not readily apparent in the 
ECEC sector, except in a very narrowly consum-
erist form.
Compulsory schooling: Another 
experience of the market model
ECEC is not the only field where the market 
model has taken hold. It has assumed a larger 
role in the field of compulsory (and post-com-
pulsory) education, with “advocates of choice 
and competition (continuing) to exercise a 
marked influence on education governance 
reform debates in the developed world and – 
increasingly – the developing world” (UNESCO 
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2008: 163). There is, of course, no simple equiva-
lence between the two fields. Compulsory edu-
cation has been a universal and publicly funded 
service for many years, at least in rich countries, 
with an extensive network of services and a 
well-established professionalised body of edu-
cators. However, the results of marketisation 
here may hold some clues of wider relevance, 
confirming issues already apparent in ECEC or 
hinting at issues meriting closer attention.
A recently published report from UNESCO, 
the seventh edition of the Education For All 
(EFA) global monitoring report (UNESCO 2008), 
contains an overview of evidence on the conse-
quences of increasing individual parental choice 
and intra-school competition in school systems. 
The report summarises the attraction of choice 
and competition, and the underlying rationality 
for pursuing these market policies:
“In standard economic theory, choice and 
competition are two of the most power-
ful drivers of efficiency, with the spur of 
the market acting to raise productivity and 
enhance welfare. Few people see education 
provision as directly comparable with the 
production of market goods and services. 
But competition and its corollary, choice, 
are increasingly seen as antidotes for the 
failings of public education systems in rela-
tion to learning standards and equity gaps.”  
          (UNESCO 2008: 159)
The report goes on to note that governments, 
who remain ultimately responsible for school 
systems, “play a key role in defining the param-
eters of choice”, for example through systems 
of funding (e.g. supporting private providers 
directly or indirectly via subsidies to parents) 
or handing over public provision to private 
organisations. 
What has emerged from 20 years or more of 
policy activity? Overall, UNESCO is wary of 
generalisations: “Experiences and outcomes 
have varied … context is important” (p. 159). 
However, the results provide no clear-cut 
endorsement for marketisation: “The idea that 
increased parental choice leads to improved 
learning outcomes has intuitive appeal but is 
not well supported by evidence” (p. 160). For 
example, analysis by OECD of results from the 
Programme for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA) study of 15-year-olds in over 50 
countries concludes that “whether students are 
in competitive schools or not does not matter 
for their performance when socio-economic fac-
tors are accounted for” (OECD 2007: 236); while 
in the United States, “advantages to academic 
outcomes stemming from voucher programmes 
are at most notably modest, and also certainly 
do not rise to the level anticipated by the early 
optimistic assumptions” (Lubienski 2008).
If the results of choice and competition for 
improved efficiency seem thin, what about the 
other argument deployed for them: closing the 
equity gap? Here, UNESCO pointedly observes, 
“The fact that competition by its nature creates 
losers as well as winners is sometimes forgotten” 
(p. 161). Indeed, “school choice can exacerbate 
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inequalities in many ways”. In particular, for a 
variety of reasons, disadvantaged children end 
up often concentrated in the worst-performing 
schools, while more advantaged families are best 
able to work the system: “Research in the United 
States shows that parents with wider social 
networks and more access to information are 
more likely to take advantage of choice policies 
and that they are better able to ensure that their 
children enter the higher quality schools they 
select” (p. 162). Put another way, middle-class 
parents are more likely to thrive in a system of 
choice and competition, able to deploy greater 
resources of knowledge, skills and contacts than 
less advantaged groups (Ball et al.1994; Whitty 
et al. 1998; Ball 2003). As Ball observes, “interna-
tionally, school choice policies are taken advan-
tage of and primarily work in the interests of 
middle-class families” (Ball 2003: 37). 
UNESCO’s conclusion is downbeat. Choice and 
competition between providers “may have the 
potential to play a role in improving education 
quality, (but so far) there is little evidence of 
that potential being realised on a significant 
scale” (p. 170).
One possible consequence of marketisation not 
considered by the UNESCO report is that, over 
time, it may in fact change the subjectivity of 
participants. That rather than resisting, parents 
actually assume the role of Homo economicus, 
economically rational actors, calculating, com-
petitive and autonomous consumers, struggling 
to make the best choice for their child, with no 
account for other ‘consumers’, the fair distribu-
tion of collective resources (Biesta and Lawy 
2006) or the wider public good. A study soon 
after the major reforms in English education 
policy were ushered in by the 1988 Education 
Act noted that “parents of children in primary 
schools in England increasingly began to iden-
tify themselves as consumers during the course 
of the study” (Hughes et al. 1994). However, it 
should be recalled from the earlier discussion 
that it is one thing to think of yourself as a 
consumer, another to act as Homo economicus.
If this changed subjectivity is occurring in 
compulsory education, will the same occur with 
ECEC as new generations are conditioned to the 
market model? And if so, how should we view 
such (actual or potential) changes? As a positive 
adaptation to an efficient economic system? 
Or as the ‘corrosion of character’ that Sennett 
(1998) sees as the consequence of free market 
capitalism? The answer, like the question, is 
political and ethical.
The rationale of the market model is that of a 
calculating consumer, pursuing private benefit 
through choice between competitive businesses 
that jockey for advantage in a market place. 
What this rationale confronts and threatens to 
erode is “any conception of the public good as 
collective good determined through democratic 
participation, contestation, and judgement in 
the public sphere” (Ransom 2003: 470). I turn 
now to consider an alternative model for the 
delivery and practice of ECEC, one that fore-
grounds public good, democratic participation 
and contestation. 
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“Democracy needs to be reborn in each   
generation, and education is its midwife.”
     (John Dewey)
“Our society faces challenges where we need 
to act collaboratively more than ever. We 
need to deepen democracy through more 
deliberative and participative democratic 
mechanisms that spread democracy into the 
‘everyday’ of our lives. And we need to foster 
a stronger public realm and associative 
democracy with organisations that bring 
people together to live and learn together.”  
      (Shah and Goss 2007: 26)
Changing direction: The model of 
democratic experimentalism
It is time now to introduce an other (not the 
other) model for the provision of ECEC services, 
which I have termed ‘democratic experimental-
ism’. To re-iterate the introduction, I do not 
claim that this model is the only alternative to 
the market model. Nor do I claim that it does 
the same as the market model, only better. Each 
model, therefore, has its own logic or ration-
ality that determines what is necessary and 
desirable, what makes sense and what should 
be strived for. Like all models, in the 
real world neither model is likely to be found 
in a pure form, nor to function perfectly; we 
are more likely to find approximations than 
perfect replicas. 
What do the two terms ‘democratic’ and ‘experi-
mentalism’ mean? And why do they belong 
together? Proponents of the market model 
may argue for the market as a perfect form of 
democracy, enabling each person to express 
their preferences and make their choices, co-
ordinated by the invisible hand of the market, 
a consumer-driven and highly individualistic 
form that Apple (2005) describes as ‘thin’. I adopt 
a ‘thick’ form that sees democracy as assuming 
collective forms and concerns; certainly it 
involves people pursuing their own interests 
but also with some capacity and opportunity 
to deliberate upon, judge and decide upon the 
common good. In short, I opt here for a political 
rather than an economic concept of democracy.
I also opt for understanding democracy as a 
complex and multi-layered concept. It involves 
certain formal institutions and procedures: 
elected governments, legislatures and man-
agement committees, for example. But there 
is much more to it; democracy can pervade 
and shape every facet of being, relationship 
and behaviour. In the words of John Dewey, 
described by Carr and Hartnett as “the most 
influential educational philosopher of the 20th 
century” (1996: 54), democracy is “primarily 
a mode of associated living embedded in the 
culture and social relationships of everyday 
life”; it is “a personal way of individual life: … 
it signifies the possession and continual use of 
certain attitudes, forming personal character 
Chapter 2: The model of democratic experimentalism
30
and determining desire and purpose in all the 
relations of life” (Dewey 1939: 2). Discussing 
the concept of listening, but equally applicable 
to the broader concept of democracy, Rinaldi 
pursues the same theme: “Listening is not only 
a technique and a didactic methodology, but a 
way of thinking and seeing ourselves in rela-
tionship with others and the world” (quoted 
in Moss et al. 2005: 6). While Langsted speaks 
of a ‘cultural climate’ that fosters listening and 
involvement of children and which will “then 
lead to structures and procedures that can guar-
antee the involvement of children” (Langsted 
1994: 42). 
Understood in this sense, democracy is far more 
than a system of government; it is not just a 
political matter or simply the practice of major-
ity rule. It is a moral ideal and way of life, both 
personal and collective, that needs constant 
attention and practice. It is about the inclusion 
and influence of everyone, minorities as well 
as majorities; it is about ineradicable difference 
and disagreement, but it is also about negotiat-
ing on the basis of shared adherence to certain 
principles. As such, it values certain attitudes, 
qualities and behaviours, whether in major 
decisions of state or in the everyday life of the 
family, nursery or school: plurality, respect for 
difference, dialogue, listening, deliberation, 
shared enquiry, critical judgement, co-operation, 
collective decision-making, individual freedom, 
the common good, participation. It also 
requires faith in humanity: “Democracy is a 
way of personal life controlled not merely by 
faith in human nature in general but by faith 
in the capacity of human beings for intelligent 
judgment and action if proper conditions are 
furnished” (Dewey 1939: 2). Unger echoes this 
view, arguing that an essential doctrine of 
democracy is “faith in the constructive powers 
of ordinary men and women” (Unger 2005b: 67).
It is important to emphasise that there is no 
choice to be made between democracy as a 
form of political organisation and democracy 
as a way of life: they are both needed and 
interdependent. Again Dewey makes the point 
strongly:
“Unless democratic habits of thought and 
action are part of the fibre of a people, 
political democracy is insecure. It cannot 
stand in isolation. It must be buttressed by 
the presence of democratic methods in all 
social relationships.” 
              (Dewey 1937: 467)
Democratic methods in social relationships 
apply to “all modes of human association”, 
including the family, the school and the nursery. 
Democracy of government requires democracy 
in the nursery (and school), and vice versa; 
and while putting in place certain democratic 
structures and procedures is important, so too is 
furnishing conditions that foster certain values 
and understandings that nourish certain ways of 
everyday living and relating. 
Experimentation is about bringing something 
new to life, whether that something is a 
thought, knowledge, a service or a tangible 
product. It expresses a willingness, a desire in 
fact, to invent, to think differently, to imagine 
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and try out different ways of doing things. It is 
driven by the desire to go beyond what already 
exists, to venture into the not yet known, not to 
be bound by the given, the familiar, the prede-
termined, the norm: “Experimentation is always 
that which is in the process of coming about 
– the new, remarkable, and interesting that 
replace the appearance of truth and are more 
demanding than it is” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 111).
Like democracy, experimentation can have its 
more formal side, involving instituting new 
projects in a service or community; but it also 
represents a way of living and relating that is 
open-ended (avoiding closure), open-minded 
(welcoming the unexpected) and open-hearted 
(valuing difference). It can be a new take on an 
old subject, bringing to bear new perspectives 
and methods; or responding to a new subject, 
one that has emerged because of changing 
conditions or new understandings. Without 
experimentation, we are locked into an endless 
round of reproducing, in which the same 
prescribed means pursue the same known ends, 
in a repetitive and sterile process that gradually 
decays from the tedium of repetition.
Experimentation, of course, is not solely or 
necessarily connected to democracy. It can be 
associated with a certain scientific method, 
where parameters and conditions are controlled 
and outcomes are expected. 
It is often linked to markets “that allow for 
experimentation by many economic decision-
makers who can expect rich rewards for success” 
(Hutton and Schneider 2008: 8). Markets, it is 
argued, are dynamic in seeking out and applying 
new technologies and new products, to increase 
efficiency and to respond to consumer demand. 
So they are, but they are neither sufficient nor 
infallible; innovation requires certain condi-
tions and markets often fail. Equally important, 
markets provide no means for experimentation 
that enables public deliberation on what is 
important, expresses the collective will on 
where to innovate, creates “innovation-friendly 
co-operative practices” (Unger 2005a: 52) or 
shares equitably the benefits of innovation. 
That needs what Unger terms ‘democratic 
experimentalism’:
“The provision of public services must be 
an innovative collective practice, moving 
forward the qualitative provision of the 
services themselves. That can no longer 
happen in our current understanding of 
efficiency and production by the mechanical 
transmission of innovation from the top. It 
can only happen through the organisation 
of a collective experimental practice from 
below. … Democracy is not just one more 
terrain for the institutional innovation that 
I advocate. It is the most important terrain.” 
        (Unger 2005b: 179, 182)
For Unger, experimentation is an essential 
element of what he terms ‘high energy democ-
racy’, which should include “vastly expanded 
opportunities to try out, in particular parts of 
the country or sectors of the economy, different 
ways of doing things” (Unger 2005b: 78).
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In his study of innovative schools serving 
disadvantaged communities, Leadbeater draws 
a somewhat similar connection, in this case 
between innovation and collaboration (collabo-
ration might be considered a quality needed for 
democracy, but not as synonymous):
“Lasting public innovations are invariably 
deeply collaborative undertakings, which 
succeed only with the mobilisation and 
collaboration of many different participants. 
In the case of changes to education, these 
players involve at least pupils and parents, 
teachers and governments, politicians and 
policy-makers, both national and local, as 
well as related public agencies, employers 
and the community around a school. Public 
innovation is more like mobilising a social 
movement … around which a variety of 
competing and collaborating companies can 
work. That process of open, collaborative 
innovation, is impossible unless the people 
involved share common goals and frames of 
reference.” 
           (Leadbeater 2008: 14)
Just as the market model is inscribed with 
distinctive values, understandings, concepts and 
particular goals, so too the model of democratic 
experimentalism has distinctive qualities. The 
market model is based on a relationship of 
trade or exchange between two individuals, a 
consumer and a seller; the model of democratic 
experimentalism on relationships of dialogue 
and creativity between citizens. The market 
model posits a utility-maximising Homo eco-
nomicus, focused on individual (including 
family) needs and benefits and freed “from 
what are construed as the burdensome chains 
of social justice and social responsibility” 
(Davies and Saltmarsh 2007: 3). This active and 
autonomous risk-managing subject is engaged 
in a calculative and contractual relationship 
with a commodity-providing and self-interested 
provider, kept up to the mark by the discipline 
of competition; without such competition, 
resources will be wasted and provision will be 
unresponsive. This subject is also an adult, the 
child being treated as an object for whom care 
or education is needed and on whom outcomes 
are wrought. ECEC is depoliticised, being 
“displaced to the private realm – becoming 
matters for domestic deliberation or consumer 
choice” (Hay 2007: 85) (although the degree 
of displacement will vary depending how far 
government regulates the market).
The model of democratic experimentalism, by 
contrast, presumes a subject who is capable and 
willing to adopt a public as well as a private 
role, with a sense of social justice and responsi-
bility, and who is a citizen concerned with 
collective as well as individual well-being, bear-
ing both rights and responsibilities. This subject 
can be child or adult, children being viewed as 
agents and rights-bearing citizens in the here 
and now, whose views and experiences need full 
expression in the processes of democratic par-
ticipation that are central to this model. Central 
values of this model are participation, dialogue, 
trust – and choice. 
It is important to make clear at this point that 
the use of the word ‘choice’, in the context of 
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this model, refers to the democratic process of 
collective choice or decision-making, not the 
individual choice of the market model: ‘choice’ 
is thus a value in both models, but understood 
in very different ways. As a recent report into 
Britain’s democracy puts it: 
“We do not believe that the consumer and 
the citizen are one and the same, as the new 
market-driven technocracy seems to assume. 
Consumers act as individuals, making deci-
sions largely on how an issue will affect them-
selves and their families. Citizenship implies 
membership of a collective where decisions 
are taken not just in the interest of the indi-
vidual but for the collective as a whole or for 
a significant part of that collective.” 
    (Power Inquiry 2006: 169) 
Bentley blames a shift from collective to indi-
vidual choice-making for the contemporary 
crisis of democracy:
“Liberal democracy combined with market 
capitalism has reinforced the tendency of 
individuals to act in ways that reduce our 
ability to make collective choices. This is the 
underlying reason for the crisis in democ-
racy. … Not enough people see democratic 
politics as part of their own personal 
identity to sustain the cultures and institu-
tions through which political legitimacy 
is created. The result is that our preoccu-
pation with making individual choices is 
undermining our ability to make collective 
choices. Our democracy is suffocating itself.” 
             (Bentley 2005: 9, 19)
Carr and Hartnett, in the excerpt from their 
book Education and the Struggle for Democracy 
that starts this paper, draw a similar distinction. 
In a democracy, they argue, individuals do not 
only express personal preferences, pursuing 
narrow self-interests in a competitive market-
place. They also “make public and collective 
choices related to the common good of their 
society” (Carr and Hartnett 1996: 192).
These different understandings of choice are 
central to the two models. Individual choice, 
as prioritised by the market model, addresses 
diversity through differentiation of individuals 
and services and exclusive attentiveness to 
private interests; individuals seek services that 
best cater to their preferences, perspectives and 
means, the key question being,  ‘what is best for 
me/my child/my family?’ The market model’s 
goal is ‘freedom of choice’, meaning freedom 
from any consideration of the common good or 
shared responsibility: the views, prejudices and 
preferences of the autonomous consumer go 
unquestioned, since the market exists solely to 
cater to them. 
Collective choice, as prioritised in democratic 
experimentalism, addresses diversity through 
the engagement of individuals in democratic 
relationships and actions; individuals encounter 
each other in a common service, be it a 
common nursery or school. But a common 
nursery or school should not be confused with 
a standardised or standardising nursery or 
school; it does not deny difference or assume 
everyone is the same, indeed it is based on deep 
respect for alterity and the absolute singularity 
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of the individual. It assumes that the democratic 
process involves processes of constructing – to 
a greater or lesser degree – shared interests, 
values, identities and purposes; that this process 
involves recognition of otherness and plurality, 
contestation and agonistic relationships; that 
new thought and knowledge, as opposed to 
reproduction and transmission of existing 
thought and knowledge, requires encounters 
with others; that such thought and knowledge 
is a key part of the common good that nurseries 
and schools can produce; and that education 
involves individual learning through social rela-
tionships, just as autonomy (the ability to con-
struct our own meanings and make our own 
decisions) requires interdependence. Last but 
not least, collective choice involves having to 
weigh up personal interests with the common 
good, to arrive at a position that gives recogni-
tion to both. Rather than ‘freedom of choice’ 
as an aim of policy, as in the market model, we 
might speak of ‘responsibility of choice’ as an 
aim of democratic experimentalism, involving 
the responsibility of having to make a choice 
that surpasses the purely individual. 
As well as different understandings of the 
subject – adult and child – the two models 
have different understandings of ECEC services 
themselves. In democratic experimentalism, 
an ECEC service is not a provider of a private 
commodity to a customer. It is in the public 
realm: as such it is a public space, a public good 
and a public responsibility10, an expression of a 
community taking collective responsibility for 
the education and upbringing of its young chil-
dren. Services feel a responsibility for and wish 
to be open to all local families, not just to those 
wanting and able to pay for a commodity; and 
because of their commitment to participation, 
these services want to be both inclusive and 
responsive to the needs of all local families11. 
Spaces in the public realm, in particular ECEC 
services and schools, are understood in demo-
cratic experimentalism as being of the utmost 
importance for the health of society. All citizens 
attend them as of right; they are, therefore, vital 
to the creation of social cohesion and solidarity. 
They protect and encourage social values of 
sharing, mutuality, collaboration – and democ-
racy: “Our children learn to constrain and 
contextualise the values learned in capitalism 
– greed and instant gratification. … We satisfy 
a basic human need for expression as part of a 
group, a collective” (Shah and Goss 2007: 73). 
Adopting democratic experimentalism as a 
model for ECEC, with an understanding of these 
services as being in the public realm, involves 
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10 Fielding (2001) distinguishes ‘responsibility’ from ‘accountability’. ‘Accountability’ is predominantly contractual and legal, “a largely  
 negative instrument of social and political control” (p. 699). ‘Responsibility’, the term I use here, is primarily a moral concept, and  
 “elicits and requires a felt and binding mutuality…[it] tends to be a largely positive, morally resonant means of encouraging mutually  
 supportive endeavour to which both, or all parties feel reciprocally and interdependently committed” (p. 700).
11 Questioning a strict dichotomy between public and private domains, Vandenbroeck, Roets and Snoeck (2009) argue that ECEC services  
 can be “fascinating sites to study issues of diversity and democracy” because they are places of “daily encounters (or confrontations for  
 that matter) between the intimacy of family lives and the public domain … places of continuous negotiations between private and  
 public domains in which hybridisation of identity and multiple belongings are shaped”.
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what Marquand describes as safeguarding the 
public domain “from incursions by the market 
domain of buying and selling”. The goods of 
this domain – whether care, health, education – 
“should not be treated as commodities or proxy 
commodities”, nor does the “language of buyer 
and seller, producer and consumer” belong here 
(Marquand 2000: 212–213). 
As part of the public realm or domain, ECEC 
services (and schools) can further be under-
stood as forums, or places of encounter, for 
citizens, young and old, in which many projects 
are possible – social, cultural, ethical, aesthetic, 
economic and political. Here are just a few of 
these projects, to give a hint of the potential of 
these social institutions, definitely not a com-
plete inventory:
construction of knowledge, values and •	
identities;
researching children’s learning processes;•	
community and group support and •	
empowerment; 
cultural (including linguistic) sustainability •	
and renewal;
promoting gender and other forms of •	
equality; 
supporting economic development;•	
democratic and ethical practice.•	
The last example includes the practice in ECEC 
services of democratic politics around a range of 
issues concerning children, families, education 
and the relationship of these issues to society, 
discussed in more detail below. These issues are 
brought into the public realm and politicised; 
that is, they move from the private realm or the 
realm of technical expertise to become subject 
to public processes of deliberation, decision-
making and human agency (Hay 2007); 
examples of political issues will be given below. 
Rather than ‘delivering’ predetermined ‘out-
comes’, the ECEC service in the model of demo-
cratic experimentalism is a potential, a place of 
possibilities; some of these are predetermined, 
but many others are not, proving unexpected 
and surprising, a source of wonder and 
amazement. Surprise, wonder and amazement 
are possible and valued when not subject to the 
tyranny of predetermined outcomes, but also 
because of the importance attached to ‘experi-
mentalism’. This goes beyond innovation or 
responsiveness; it is far more than simply 
meeting existing or new consumer preferences 
or applying new technologies. It means services 
engaging with families – children and adults 
– in the creation or co-construction of new 
knowledge, new understandings and new 
desires, the outcomes of which cannot be 
predetermined or precisely predicted. Services 
become like workshops or laboratories, where 
new projects can be created and tried, produced 
from the encounter of different perspectives 
and identities; in this way, participatory democ-
racy is a condition for experimentation. 
The results of this experimentalism are what 
Hardt and Negri (2005) term “immaterial 
production”, which includes “the production of 
ideas, images, knowledge, communication, co-
operation, and affective relations … social life 
itself” (p. 146). Such immaterial production, 
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they argue, is based on co-operation, col-
laboration and communication – “in short, its 
foundation in the common” (p. 147). In the 
model, the immaterial products created by 
the experimentalism of ECEC services are not 
appropriated as private property, but made 
freely available for the common good. 
The term ‘childcare’ is quite inadequate to 
describe the breadth and complexity of the 
services in this model; in the sense of providing 
a safe and secure environment for children 
while their parents work, ‘childcare’ is just 
one of the many possibilities that services can 
provide. While childcare is recognised to be 
important in societies where most parents are 
employed or studying, these services are not 
centred on this function and are not ‘childcare 
services’. Other terms might be used to talk 
about such services: ‘kindergartens’, ‘children’s 
centres’ and ‘schools’ (reclaiming this term for 
a service that practises education in its broadest 
sense) are just some of the possibilities.
Democratic experimentalism: What 
the model looks like
In this section, I want to sketch out what a 
model of democratic experimentalism might 
mean for the provision of ECEC: how it might 
be implemented. As indicated in the preceding 
section, the model in its ideal form applies at 
and to several levels: from the national or fed-
eral, through the regional and the local, to the 
individual institution – the children’s centre, 
kindergarten or nursery12. It is possible to have 
an individual centre or an individual commu-
nity working creatively – but in isolation – with 
democratic experimentalism. Ideally, though, 
all levels should be committed to the model, to 
form a mutually supportive system. In this case, 
national and local government value and sup-
port democracy in the nursery, but the nursery 
itself promotes and supports democracy in the 
wider society. For, as Dewey reflects:
“It is the main business of the family and the 
school to influence directly the formation 
and growth of attitudes and dispositions, 
emotional, intellectual and moral. Whether 
this educative process is carried on in a pre-
dominantly democratic or non-democratic 
way becomes, therefore, a question of tran-
scendent importance not only for education
itself but for its final effect upon all the 
interests and activities of a society that is 
committed to the democratic way of life.”  
      (Dewey 1937).
The discussion in this section, therefore, 
addresses all levels and their interdependency. 
The argument is that different levels have 
responsibility for different democratic choices 
and that each level, while adopting democratic 
practice in its own workings, should support 
democratic practice at other levels. 
12 This discussion omits another important level for many countries: the European Union. This unique international body has a long- 
 standing and growing interest in ECEC services (e.g. the Barcelona Targets, setting common goals for levels of service provision, adopted  
 by member states at the Barcelona summit in March 2002). An important issue that deserves more attention is the role of the EU in the  
 development of ECEC policy and how that role might be democratically undertaken. For one perspective, see Children in Europe, 2008.
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National level
What is the democratic space at national or 
federal level? What democratic choices should 
be made there? Unger calls for “decisive choices 
in national policies and experimental devia-
tions and dissents in particular parts” (Unger 
2005b: 30). One of the most fundamental 
choices to be decided in national policy is 
which model of service provision to choose 
– for example, a market model or a model of 
democratic experimentalism. 
Let us assume the choice has been made for a 
model of democratic experimentalism, a 
collective national choice made after democratic 
dialogue and deliberation. Then the next ‘deci-
sive choice’ is to define a national framework 
of entitlements and standards that expresses 
democratically agreed national values, expecta-
tions and objectives; and assures the material 
conditions needed to make these entitlements 
and standards a reality, enabling other levels 
to play an active role in implementation. This 
framework should be clear and strong, without 
smothering all regional or local diversity, a 
difficult balancing act that needs to leave space 
for the practice of democracy at more local 
levels. To take some examples, it might mean: 
an entitlement to access •	 ECEC services for 
children as citizens (in my view from at least 
12 months of age), together with a funding 
system that enables all children to exercise 
their entitlement; 
a statement that early childhood services •	
are a public good and responsibility, not a 
private commodity; 
a framework curriculum that defines •	
broad values and goals but allows local 
interpretation and augmentation; 
a fully integrated early childhood policy, •	
the responsibility of one government 
department; 
a well-educated and well-paid workforce for •	
all young children (at least half of whom are 
graduates);  
active policies to reduce poverty and •	
inequality.
To encourage and support democracy and 
experimentalism in local authorities and 
individual centres, national government can 
recognise both as explicit and important values 
for the whole system of early childhood educa-
tion. Last but not least, national government 
can combine a coherent and comprehensive 
national framework – such as I have just out-
lined – with strong decentralisation, creating 
space for and guaranteeing local democratic 
decision-making and experimentation. This 
relationship, of national leadership and demo-
cratic decentralisation, is advocated in the final 
report of the OECD thematic review of early 
childhood policy, Starting strong:
“The decentralisation of management 
functions to local authorities is a gauge of 
participatory democracy. At the same time, 
the experience of ECEC policy reviews sug-
gests that central governments have a pivotal 
role in creating strong and equitable early 
childhood systems and in co-constructing 
and ensuring programme standards. In sum, 
there is a strong case to be made for minis-
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tries in charge to retain significant influence 
over both legislation and financing within 
a framework of partnership. Through these 
instruments, democratic governments 
can ensure that wider societal interests are 
reflected in early childhood systems, includ-
ing social values such as democracy, human 
rights and enhanced access for children with 
special and additional learning needs. In this 
vision the state can become the guarantor of 
democratic discussion and experimentation at 
local level, instead of simply applying policies 
from the centre.” 
     (OECD 2006: 220: emphasis added).
In this role, national government not only 
positively supports democracy at all levels, it 
also positively supports Unger’s “experimental 
deviations and dissents” (Unger 2005b: 30). 
This implies a welfare state that guarantees 
social experimentation (Santos 1995) and 
enables ‘Utopian experimentation’ to be tried 
(Held 1995). 
A final thought on the role of national govern-
ment. In its report for the English government, 
titled Children’s services markets, Pricewater-
houseCoopers suggests that the government 
should “articulate a vision for market provision” 
(2006a: 5). Government can assume a similar 
role if adopting the model of democratic 
experimentalism: it can ‘articulate a vision for 
democratic experimentalism’, a vision that is 
recognised to be provisional and contestable, 
but that is nevertheless an important reference 
point for others.
Provincial, state or regional level
I shall move now to more local levels of govern-
ment. In so doing, I am conscious of skimming 
over a level of provincial, state or regional 
government that is important in many (mostly 
federal) countries, for example Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Spain and 
the United States. A full discussion of the model 
of democratic experimentalism in ECEC would 
need to take greater account of this level of gov-
ernment, located between national and local. 
However, coming, as I do, from one of the most 
centralised countries in Europe, I feel somewhat 
ill equipped to go in any depth into issues of 
federalism and regionalisation. 
Some of the opportunities and dilemmas that 
arise in federal systems are discussed in the 
country note on Germany prepared as part of 
the OECD thematic review of early childhood. 
That identifies decentralisation and local auton-
omy – both at state (regional) and local levels 
– as a “strength of the German system” (OECD 
2004: 44). But at the same time, the country 
note identifies two conditions as being needed 
if these features are to be a strength rather than 
a weakness: a practice of diversity that involves 
a rigorous and critical process of development 
and evaluation; and “certain common, national 
standards, in particular in those areas that 
concern equity between families, and the right 
of children to provision and quality”. But 
in reality, such standards in Germany – the 
national framework referred to in the previous 
section – are underdeveloped: 
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“Only access to kindergarten is covered by a 
national norm, taking the form of a limited 
entitlement to part-time kindergarten for 
children from 3 upwards. Otherwise there 
are large differences between Länder in levels 
of provision. Similarly, funding arrangements 
vary between Länder, including what parents 
are required to pay. In the long term, such 
diversity seems unacceptable and not in the 
interests either of children or families. ECEC 
services operate under different regulations 
and now with different education plans, 
albeit defined within a broad common 
frame. Where to draw the line between 
diversity and standardisation here is a 
difficult issue, but the review team find it 
difficult to understand why there should be 
such different expectations concerning 
access to non-kindergarten services or, in 
the kindergarten field, such different norms 
in basic structural matters as group size, 
staff–child ratios and in-service training.  
             (OECD 2004: 44–45)
The early years field needs to pay more attention 
to the situation of federal states, as well as to 
those states that, though not federal, devolve 
substantial powers over education to regional 
governments, such as the Autonomous 
Communities in Spain. The issues, it could 
be argued, are similar to those in other states, 
particularly those that practice strong local 
decentralisation: the relationship between 
central and local responsibilities, between 
coherence and diversity, between citizen rights 
and local perspectives. But another layer of 
government does, undoubtedly, increase com-
plexity and may introduce qualitatively different 
issues. Not least, does a regionalised system 
weaken the next level of government, the local 
level? It is to this level that I now move.
Local authority level
The model of democratic experimentalism 
involves each level supporting democratic 
practice at other levels, partly through creat-
ing space for such practice. This means strong 
decentralisation to the local level (OECD 2006; 
Power Inquiry 2006). What does democratic 
experimentalism involve at this level? 
Some years ago, I visited an Italian city with a 
rich experience in early childhood education. 
The head of the services in this city – which is 
not, as it happens, Reggio Emilia – described 
their work over 30 years as a ‘local cultural 
project of childhood’. This description is 
echoed in the title of a book from the head 
of early childhood services in San Miniato, 
another Italian local authority: The Education 
of Young Children as a Community Project 
(Fortunati 2006). The idea of local authorities 
embarking on long-term and open-ended 
projects to explore possibilities for and with 
their young citizens captures what democratic 
experimentalism at its best and most active 
can mean and achieve in a local authority or 
commune or municipality. It captures that idea 
of political commitment, citizen participation 
and collective decision-making that may enable 
a community to take responsibility for its chil-
dren and their education (in its broadest sense): 
responsibility not just for providing services but 
for how they are understood, for the purposes 
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they serve in that community and for the peda-
gogical practice that goes on within them. 
Furthermore the term ‘project’ embodies a con-
cept of experimentation as a desire to explore 
different perspectives, create new understand-
ings and practices and to be open to new and 
unexpected possibilities; as such it connects 
work at the local authority and the nursery 
level. Here, Carlina Rinaldi (2005) explains why 
in Reggio Emilia they choose to use the term 
‘project’ to describe learning processes in their 
‘municipal schools’, but her comments could 
equally well apply to the broader cultural work 
of a local authority – what might be termed 
‘municipal learning’ through experimentation:
“[Learning takes] many directions and often 
leads to unexpected places. It is a process of 
constructing, testing and reconstructing 
theories, which are our interpretive models 
of the world. This is a group process: each 
individual – child or adult – is nurtured by 
the hypotheses and theories of others, and 
by conflicts with others that force us con-
stantly to revise our theories about reality. 
We use the term ‘project’ to define this com-
plex situation, involving constant dialogue 
between children and adults. … The word 
‘project’ evokes the idea of a dynamic process, 
a journey that involves the uncertainty and 
chance that always arises in relationship with 
others. Project work grows in many direc-
tions, with no predefined progression, no 
outcomes decided before the journey begins.” 
                (Rinaldi 2005: 19)
The local authority or commune working with 
democratic experimentalism creates a space 
for shared enquiry and dialogue from which 
a collective view of the child and her relation-
ship to the community is produced and local 
policy, practice and knowledge develops. This 
in turn is always open to democratic (re)evalua-
tion and new thinking. Such local projects may 
be actively encouraged by national levels of 
government (though in Italy, local projects have 
been the result of local governments and politi-
cians with strong democratic traditions and 
commitments to education, who are willing 
and able to use space made available to them by 
a weak national government).
How local cultural projects of childhood can be 
actively encouraged, what other conditions they 
need to flourish and what structures and proc-
esses may sustain them – all these conditions 
are important subjects for further research. We 
perhaps need rather fewer studies of the effec-
tiveness of this or that technical programme 
in producing predefined outcomes, and rather 
more studies on how and why certain com-
munities (or individual centres) have managed 
to become local cultural projects, capable of 
developing an approach that is participatory, 
experimental and researching. Nor should we 
expect that these projects can be equally suc-
cessful and innovative in all local areas. Some 
communities will be more creative, curious 
and democratic than others; though we should 
not underestimate the potential for creativity, 
curiosity and democracy that may exist in local 
areas or among individual citizens. 
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But even where local cultural projects of child-
hood fail to thrive, the local government level 
can still make an important contribution to 
democratic experimentalism. Local authorities 
interpret and augment the national framework, 
in areas such as curricula. They can affirm the 
importance of democracy as a value, and they 
can support democracy in the nursery. And 
they have an important role to play in the 
provision of ECEC services. 
In the market model, the local authority 
manages the market to ensure adequate supply 
and strong competition: it plays no role as 
a provider, except perhaps very occasionally 
in the very last resort. In democratic experi-
mentalism, the local authority nurtures the 
development of democratic social institutions 
provided by a range of ‘social agents’. It actively 
promotes: collaboration between them, foster-
ing networks and shared projects; democratic 
practices within them; and experimentation, 
individually and collectively. But it also acts as a 
provider itself, not of all services, but of some, 
both to ensure it has direct experience of what 
it means to create democratic experimental 
services and to serve as a pacesetter for experi-
mentalism (see the final section of this paper 
for Unger’s argument about an active provider 
role for government). 
In the nursery
Finally, I want to consider democratic experi-
mentalism at its most local level, in the early 
childhood institution itself: the nursery, crèche, 
pre-school, kindergarten, nursery school or any 
of the other terms we use to describe settings 
for collective early childhood education. The 
starting point needs to be how we imagine, 
construct or understand this institution: what 
do we think the nursery is? Two understandings 
permeate the market model: the early child-
hood institution as an enclosure or factory, 
where technology can be applied to produce 
predetermined outcomes; and the early child-
hood institution as business, selling a commod-
ity to consumers.
But there are many other understandings, some 
of which are more productive of democratic 
experimentalist practice: in particular, as already 
outlined, the understanding of the early child-
hood institution as a public forum or meeting 
place in civil society or as a place of encounter 
and dialogue between citizens, from which 
many possibilities can emerge –  some expected, 
others not – and which is most productive when 
relationships are governed by democratic prac-
tice. The early childhood institution in which 
democratic practice is foregrounded creates one 
of the new spaces that are needed if democracy 
is to be renewed: to use Bentley’s term, it can be 
a place for ‘everyday democracy’. In particular, 
it offers the possibility of democratic practice 
that is not representative (through electing 
representatives) but direct: the rule of all by all. 
This space offers opportunities for all citizens, 
younger and older, to participate – be they 
children or parents, practitioners or politicians, 
or indeed any other local citizen. Topics ignored 
or neglected in traditional politics can be made 
the subjects of democratic practice. 
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It is important to re-iterate an earlier distinction: 
between democracy as a principle of government 
and democracy as a form of living together. I 
do not want to set them into opposition; it is 
possible to imagine a nursery that had both 
very democratic structures (for example, man-
agement by elected representatives of parents 
and educators) and a strong democratic ethos 
that placed high value on listening, dialogue, 
deliberation and other qualities that make up 
democracy as a form of associated living. But 
the two need not go together; or they may over-
lap but by no means fully. Moreover, even with 
democratic structures of government involving 
full representation from all adults involved in a 
centre, it is unlikely that children would play an 
equal role in these decision-making structures 
– though they could have influence on deci-
sions through a democratic ethos of listening 
and dialogue.
So democratic practice covers a large area of 
possibilities, and democracy in the nursery can 
take many forms, from the very formal to the 
very informal. It might, perhaps, be more useful 
to think of each nursery having a ‘democratic 
profile’, indicating in what areas, in what ways 
and with whom democracy was practiced. But 
without at all wishing to play down democracy 
as a matter of relationships, attitudes and 
values expressed in everyday life, I want here to 
consider four examples of rather more formal 
democratic participation, which following 
Mouffe’s definitions (see Introduction) (Mouffe 
2000), involve bringing politics and the political 
into the nursery:
Decision-making1.  about the purposes, 
the practices and the environment of the 
nursery, addressing John Dewey’s principle 
that “all those who are affected by social 
institutions must have a share in producing 
and managing them” (Dewey 1937). This is 
closest to the idea of democracy as a princi-
ple of government, in which either repre-
sentatives or all members of certain groups 
have some involvement in decisions in 
specified areas. Examples might be nurser-
ies run as co-operatives by a staff or parent 
group or nurseries run by a community 
of some form. Another example would be 
the elected boards of parents that all early 
childhood centres in Denmark must have, 
which are involved in pedagogical, budget-
ary and staffing issues (Hansen 2002). How 
much power, in theory or practice, such 
bodies exercise may vary considerably.
Evaluation2.  of pedagogical work through 
participatory methods. In the book Beyond 
Quality in Early Childhood Education and 
Care (Dahlberg, Moss and Pence 2007), 
the authors contrast a technical language 
of evaluation, ‘quality’, with a democratic    
language, ‘meaning making’13. The language 
13 The concept of evaluative ‘languages’ was suggested by Reggio Children Publications, when they translated and published (in Italy)  
 the book, Beyond Quality in Early Childhood Education and Care (Dahlberg et al. 2007), changing the original English subtitle of  
 ‘postmodern perspectives’ to I linguaggi della valutazione – ‘languages of evaluation’. 
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of ‘quality’ involves a supposedly objective 
observer applying externally determined 
norms to an institution, to make a decon-
textualised assessment of conformity to 
these norms. The language of ‘meaning 
making’, by contrast, speaks of evaluation 
as a democratic process of interpretation,   
a process that involves making practice vis-
ible and thus subject to reflection, dialogue 
and argumentation, leading to an assess-
ment that is contextualised and provisional 
because it is always subject to contestation. 
‘Quality’ offers a statement of fact, ‘mean-
ing making’ a judgement of value. The two 
languages work with very different tools: 
‘quality’ with checklists and similar stand-
ardised templates, and ‘meaning making’ 
with pedagogical documentation, which I 
explain below.
Contesting dominant discourses,3.  confron-
ting what Foucault terms regimes of truth, 
which seek to shape our subjectivities and 
practices through their universal truth 
claims and their relationship with power. 
This political activity seeks to make core 
assumptions and values visible and contest-
able. Yeatman (1994) refers to it as ‘post-
modern politics’ and offers some examples: 
a politics of epistemology, contesting 
modernity’s idea of knowledge14; a politics 
of representation, about whose perspectives 
have legitimacy; and a politics of differ-
ence, which contests those groups claiming 
a privileged position of objectivity on a 
contested subject. But we could extend the 
areas opened up to politics that are repo-
liticised as legitimate subjects for inclusive 
political dialogue and contestation: the 
politics of childhood, about the image of the 
child, the good life and what we want for 
our children; the politics of education, about 
what education can and should be; and 
the politics of gender, in the nursery and 
the home. These and many other ideas can 
be the subject of democratic engagement 
within the early childhood institution, 
examples of bringing the political into the 
nursery. By so doing, we do not and cannot 
do away with power and exclusion, but we 
can make them visible and, therefore, con-
testable in a continuous process, which:                    
 
“… should not be cause for despair because 
the desire to reach a final destination can 
only lead to the elimination of the politi-
cal and the destruction of democracy. In a 
democratic polity, conflicts and confronta-
tions, far from being a sign of imperfection, 
indicate that democracy is alive and inhab-
ited by pluralism.”  
               (Mouffe 2000: 34) 
It is through contesting dominant discourses 4. 
that the fourth political activity can emerge: 
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 behaviour of phenomena” (Santos 1995: 14); it adopts values such as objectivity, order, stability and universality. A postmodern idea of  
 knowledge would emphasise knowledge as always partial, perspectival and provisional, “local knowledge created and disseminated  
 through argumentative discourse” (p. 37).
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opening up for change, through developing  
a critical approach to what exists and 
envisioning utopias and turning them into 
utopian action. For as Foucault (1988) also 
notes, there is a close connection between 
contesting dominant discourses, think-
ing differently and change: “As soon as one 
can no longer think things as one formerly 
thought them, transformation becomes both 
very urgent, very difficult and quite possible.” 
Some readers may question the omission here 
of another activity: an education in democracy 
or citizenship as an explicit part of the cur-
riculum. In doing so, I follow Dewey’s view 
that education should, first and foremost, be 
about being democratic, with an emphasis on 
democratic organisation and culture, rather 
than about preparing the individual for future 
democracy, becoming a citizen: “Much of our 
present education fails because it neglects this 
fundamental principle of the school as a form 
of community life” (Dewey 1897: 78). Democracy 
is, in short, not so much a goal as a process 
(London 2000).
Biesta and Lawy (2006) take a similar view when 
they argue the need to move from an idea of 
‘teaching citizenship’ to ‘learning democracy’. 
They criticise the former on grounds of its 
individualistic approach and its assumption 
that citizenship is an outcome and young 
people, therefore, are not-yet-citizens. Instead 
they assume a concept of citizenship and 
democracy as something that people continu-
ously do, that young people are always par-
ticipants in social life, and that being a citizen 
“involves much more than the simple acquisition 
of certain fixed core values and dispositions. It 
is participative and as such it is itself an inher-
ently participative process” (p. 73).
If democracy is a way of living and relating, and 
if children are citizens and subjects with rights 
from birth, then democracy is learnt in life and 
through relationships, including the demo-
cratic practice of the nursery or school, not as a 
distinct subject confined to set periods and a set 
curriculum.
Not just on paper: Some examples of 
democratic experimentalism
The model of democratic experimentalism is 
less developed than its market counterpart. 
It lacks the theoretical and policy attention 
lavished on the latter by international organisa-
tions, governments, academics and companies. 
But it does exist. There are examples where 
democracy, and to a lesser extent experimen-
talism, have been explicitly proposed as basic 
values for ECEC services; in some examples, 
these values have been acted on to create serv-
ices. Occasionally these examples are part of 
and supported by national or local government, 
enjoying the backing of formal democratic 
institutions. More often, they are local upwell-
ings that emerge from a particular combination 
of local conditions and serve a small area. But 
these local projects provide evidence of the 
large reserves of inventiveness, solidarity and 
commitment to the public good that are avail-
able in our societies, reserves that are too often 
ignored and underused. 
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A few of these examples are cited in this section; 
further research would reveal more, probably 
many more. They demonstrate the existence 
and viability of the model in practice, albeit not 
always in complete form. They provide pointers 
as to how the model might be implemented, 
which is the subject of the section after this. 
Starting strong and the Nordic countries
The first example is not of actual policy or 
provision, but of an international organisation 
recognising and proposing the centrality of 
democracy for ECEC services. The OECD 
thematic review of early childhood education 
and care, Starting strong, is (in my view) the 
most important cross-national study in this 
field. After eight years’ work in 20 countries, 
the final report concludes with a call “to aspire 
toward ECEC systems that support broad learn-
ing, participation and democracy”. This means 
“an early childhood system founded on demo-
cratic values”, that encourages “democratic 
reflexes in children”, and that recognises the 
“democratic dimension” in parental involve-
ment, “that is the exercise by parents of their 
basic right to be involved in the education 
of their children” (OECD 2006: 218–219). The 
report envisages “early childhood services as a 
life space where educators and families work 
together to promote the well-being, participa-
tion and learning of young children … based 
on the principle of democratic participation” 
and notes that “this principle can also work 
effectively in management” (p. 220). 
This conclusion by OECD is inspired, in part, 
by a national policy: the Swedish national pre-
school curriculum, with its clear commitment 
to democracy as the basis for ECEC services:
“Democracy forms the foundation of the 
pre-school. For this reason, all pre-school 
activity should be carried out in accordance 
with fundamental democratic values.” 
(Ministry of Education and Science [Sweden] 1998: 6).
Other Nordic countries, too, pay explicit atten-
tion to the importance of democracy in their 
early childhood curricula. Wagner (2006) argues 
that democracy is central to the Nordic concept 
of what is a ‘good childhood’ and notes, in 
support of this contention, that “official policy 
documents and curriculum guidelines in the 
Nordic countries acknowledge a central expec-
tation that pre-schools and schools will exem-
plify democratic principles and that children 
will be active participants in these democratic 
environments” (p. 292).
The strong value attached to democracy in 
the Nordic states is expressed not only at the 
level of the individual citizen but also in strong 
decentralisation of responsibility to local 
authorities and individual ECEC services. Unitary 
central governments create clear and strong 
national frameworks that include material 
conditions, entitlements to access, and values 
and goals for services. But these frameworks 
leave considerable scope for local authorities 
and individual services to interpret and also to 
experiment with a wide variety of pedagogical 
theories and practices. 
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Reggio Emilia
After these international and national sources 
of inspiration, there are examples of local 
experiences built on democracy as a basic value. 
The best known – but not the only – example, 
is the city of Reggio Emilia in Northern Italy, 
where the municipality has created, since the 
early 1960s, a network of ECEC centres for chil-
dren from birth to six years, termed ‘municipal 
schools’; they have achieved worldwide fame 
and recognition for their pedagogical practice, 
the US magazine Newsweek singling out a 
Reggio Emilian nursery school as the best 
nursery in the world, while the OECD Starting 
strong report praises Reggio Emilia, by name, 
for its outstanding work (OECD 2006: 207). This 
work has been based on a strong commitment 
to democracy, both as a reaction to a previous 
experience of authoritarian Fascist government 
(Dahlberg 1995) but also as a positive principle. 
I will return later to give some examples 
of what this means in practice, but for the 
moment refer to the words of three Reggio 
pedagogistas (experienced educators who each 
work with a small number of centres to deepen 
understanding of learning): 
“[The educational project of Reggio Emilia] 
is by definition a participation-based project: 
its true educational meaning is to be found 
in the participation of all concerned. This 
means that everyone – children, teachers 
and parents – is involved in sharing ideas, in 
discussion, in a sense of common purpose 
and with communication as a value. … So 
in the Reggio Emilia experience, participa-
tion does not mean simply the involvement 
of families in the life of the school. Rather 
it is a value, an identifying feature of the 
entire experience, a way of viewing those 
involved in the educational process and the 
role of the school. The subjects of participa-
tion then, even before the parents, are the 
children, who are considered to be active 
constructors of their own learning and pro-
ducers of original points of view concerning 
the world. … This idea of participation, 
therefore, defines the early childhood centre 
as a social and political place and thus as an 
educational place in the fullest sense. 
However, this is not a given, so to speak; 
it is not a natural, intrinsic part of being a 
school. It is a philosophical choice, a choice 
based on values.” 
        (Cagliari, Barozzi and Giudici 2004: 28–29) 
Note that in this quotation, participation is 
defined as a quality – an “identifying feature” – 
of the system of municipal schools, rather than 
as a quality of the good parent; the emphasis is 
on the participatory school and local project, 
rather than the participating parent, the former 
being assumed to enable the latter.
Another feature of Reggio Emilia that provides 
inspiration is its commitment not only to 
democracy but also to experimentation: it can 
indeed be described as a pedagogical experiment 
in a whole community that has run for more 
than 40 years. The municipal schools have been 
likened to “one big laboratory, a ‘workshop of 
learning and knowledge’” (Rinaldi 2006: 81) and 
“a permanent laboratory, in which children’s 
and teachers’ research processes are strongly 
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intertwined and constantly evolving” (p. 126). 
Experimentation is based on deep curiosity, a 
desire to cross borders of disciplines and per-
spectives, an openness to uncertainty and com-
plexity, and a recognition of the importance of 
research – not by outside experts (though they 
have long-standing and productive collaborations 
with leading academic researchers such as Jerome 
Bruner, Gunilla Dahlberg and Howard Gardner), 
but by local participants, understanding that:
“[R]esearch can and should take place as 
much in the classroom and by teachers 
as in the university and by ‘academics’. … 
The word ‘research’, in this sense, leaves – 
or rather, demands to come out of – the 
scientific laboratories, thus ceasing to be a 
privilege of the few (in universities and other 
designated places) to become the stance, the 
attitude with which teachers approach the 
sense and meaning of life.” 
               (Rinaldi 2006: 148)
Reggio Emilia is an example of a commitment 
to democracy and experimentation that links 
together individual centres, both to each other 
in a network of services, and to an active local 
authority. It has stood the test of time well, 
with the first centre being founded more than 
40 years ago. Over this period, this network 
of municipal centres has shown an ability to 
maintain its democratic principles and, through 
experimentalism, generate new thought and 
practice. By singling out Reggio Emilia, it is not 
my intention to imply it is the only experience 
at the level of a local authority founded on and 
permeated by democratic values and a desire to 
experiment: other communities in Italy could 
be cited (see, for example, Fortunati 2006 for 
an example of a similar experience in a small 
Tuscan commune), and there could well be 
examples from other countries. 
Sheffield Children’s Centre
Last but not least, democratic experimentalism 
can be practiced at the level of individual 
centres. An example is the Sheffield Children’s 
Centre. Started in a northern English city in 
the early 1980s as a local community initiative, 
the Centre has grown to provide a wide range 
of services for hundreds of children and young 
people from infancy to 18 years, as well as their 
families, in an inner city area of economic 
disadvantage; its work has also extended to 
initiating projects in Ethiopia, Jordan, Pakistan 
and Zimbabwe. The Centre, run as a co-opera-
tive, provides a range of ‘core’ services, includ-
ing ECEC, and free-time and play services for 
school-age children, but also a variety of other 
services for families in its local community 
and beyond, many of whom are from minority 
ethnic backgrounds: health services, language 
workshops, a contact centre where children can 
meet parents from whom they are separated, 
support for terminally ill children and parents, 
adult training opportunities, an advocacy, 
welfare rights and legal support service, and 
many more besides. As well as more formalised 
services, the Centre’s workers provide important 
support by ‘walking alongside’ families in 
difficulty, as this family vignette illustrates:
“I came to the centre for help with domestic 
violence. They found us a refuge and went 
The model of democratic experimentalism
48
back to the house to get our things. My 
husband left the country after this and they 
found us a house in Sheffield and helped us 
furnish it. They got us school placements 
and gave us a baby place at their nursery 
and got me a place on an access course in 
college. My children go to the violence sup-
port group. Everyone knows it’s the place to 
go for help. They never turn anyone away. 
The centre has kept us alive and safe and it 
has helped get over the violence. He would 
have killed us. In our community there is no 
escape and it is expected women stay with 
their husbands. The centre gave us a differ-
ent path to escape and the centre’s cultural 
workers made it OK with our community.” 
(Broadhead, Meleady and Delgado 2008: 36–37; see 
this reference for many other family vignettes and a 
fuller description and analysis of the work 
of the Centre).
Underpinning this work is a strong commit-
ment to diversity (most unusually, it has a 
mixed-gender workforce with almost equal 
numbers of men and women, but diversity 
covers many other dimensions including 
ethnicity, language, sexual orientation, age and 
disability); to children’s rights; to equal oppor-
tunities; and to democracy, building on its 
original and continuing co-operative status.
“[The Centre’s identity] reflects the desire of 
ordinary people to influence social change 
based on local demands. The centre began 
because local people expressed concerns 
about the cultural inappropriateness of a 
mainstream provision close by and it grew 
because its aim was to reflect diversity in 
all its practices. This aspiration has been 
its strength and its greatest challenge and 
locates the centre, as described by Dahlberg 
and Moss (2005: 171) as ‘a site for democratic 
practice and minor politics’.” 
        (Broadhead, Meleady and Delgado 2008: 3)
Sheffield Children’s Centre provides a vivid and 
well-documented example of the ECEC institu-
tion in the model of democratic experimental-
ism: inclusive, participatory and, consequently, 
innovative – but in response to and in dialogue 
with the community of which it is part, not 
individual consumers. In a study of the Centre, 
Delgado has drawn on the work of Manuel 
Castells on network societies (Castells 2004) 
to argue that it can be viewed as “a grassroots 
social movement, which has developed a 
number of innovations based on values and 
beliefs and on an attempt to embrace social 
inclusion” (Delgado 2006: 2). In so doing it has 
made the transition from a ‘resistance identity’ 
to a ‘project identity’: “Like resistance identities, 
project identities resist domination, but they 
also propose – and eventually implement – 
alternatives to oppressive mainstream ideas” (p. 
207, original emphasis). The experimentation in 
this case consists of an openness to constructing 
alternative ways to engage with children, fami-
lies and community. 
Are there other individual centres that, like 
Sheffield Children’s Centre, exemplify demo-
cratic experimentalism – centres generating 
innovative projects through participation and 
responsiveness to the conditions and values 
of their local communities, centres that are 
motivated not by the disciplines of the market 
but by a deep sense of responsibility and a com-
mitment to participation and inclusion? On the 
basis of first-hand knowledge, written accounts 
and word-of-mouth descriptions, I believe 
there are and that they exist in most countries. 
How many are there? Possibly many more, but 
it is impossible to say for sure, partly because 
they have received too little policy and research 
attention; our ability to evaluate the model and 
its potential is severely hampered by this neglect. 
A final example at the level of the individual 
centre concerns experimentalism as an everyday 
practice in early childhood education, i.e. as a 
way of teaching and learning. This means ques-
tioning a representational view of knowledge 
– one that understands knowledge to be an 
objective, stable and accurate representation of 
a pre-existing reality, and learning as a sender-
receiver model of transmitting knowledge that 
presumes an exact and unmediated transfer 
from a knower to a learner – “the instrumental-
ist view that communication is unambiguous 
and unmediated, and results in unproblematic 
transference with full conservation of intent” 
(Roy 2004: 298). This means taking seriously 
what we know about the complexity of learning, 
children’s diverse strategies and multiple theories 
of knowledge. This requires an educator who is:
“… more attentive to creating possibilities 
than pursuing predefined goals … removed 
from the fallacy of certainties, [assuming 
instead] responsibility to choose, experiment, 
discuss, reflect and change, focusing on the 
organisation of opportunities rather than 
the anxiety of pursuing outcomes, and 
maintaining in her work the pleasure of 
amazement and wonder.” 
             (Fortunati 2006: 37).
This means, too, working with theoretical 
perspectives that welcome complexity, diversity 
and experimentation, for instance the writings 
of post-structural theorists – such as Foucault, 
Bakhtin, Derrida and Deleuze – in which, 
as Tobin notes, “many of us have found … a 
language we can use to confront the taken-for-
granted assumptions of the [early childhood] 
field” (Tobin 2007: 28). An important and hope-
ful development in early childhood education 
and care is the increasing interest in applying 
these theoretical perspectives to everyday peda-
gogical work in the nursery, and the growing 
literature documenting this experimentation. A 
recent example is a book by Liselott Marriet 
Olsson (2009) called Movement and Experimen-
tation in Young Children’s Learning. Starting  
from the premise that young children and 
their learning are tamed, predicted, supervised, 
controlled and evaluated according to prede-
termined standards, the book argues that the 
challenge to practice and research is to find  
ways of regaining movement and experi-
mentation in learning. Inspired by the work 
of French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Feliz 
Guattari, Olsson demonstrates the possibilities 
for experimentation in the classroom through 
documenting and analysis of extensive experi-
ence in Swedish pre-schools:
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“In many of the pre-schools in the city 
of Stockholm and its suburbs and at the 
Stockholm Institute of Education, ‘everyday 
magical moments’ take place. Children, pre-
school teachers, teacher students, teacher 
educators and researchers come together 
and are literally caught up in the desire to 
experiment with subjectivity and learning. 
In these practices, experimentations and 
intense, unpredictable events are taking 
place, concerning the idea of what a child 
is, what a teacher should do, the purpose of 
a pre-school and its organisation, contents 
and forms.” 
                 (Olsson, 2009) 
Central to this experimental approach has 
been pedagogical documentation, providing a 
collaborative meeting place for all participants, 
and project work: 
“… where children and teachers collectively 
are constructing problems in intense learn-
ing processes and where the content of 
knowledge is constructed and negotiated 
rather than transmitted and reproductively 
imitated. The focus in the projects is on the 
multiplicity of perspectives that all partici-
pants can bring, and many different means 
to approach the content of knowledge are 
being used; aesthetic, ethical, political and 
scientific approaches are all employed and 
put to work in the learning processes that 
are taking place. In relation to the content of 
knowledge, children’s thinking, talking and 
doing are as valued as any other perspective 
and are often seen as important and addi-
tional perspectives on the content of knowl-
edge as it is known and already defined by 
adults, culture and history.” 
                                 (Olsson, 2009)
Experimentation, in the group setting, is the 
antithesis of so much early childhood education 
today, with its desire to predict, control, observe 
and evaluate against predefined goals, and its 
premise that there is one correct answer to 
every question, one true path of development. 
Olsson’s examples show, time after time, how 
listening, an important value of democracy, is 
linked to “collective, intense and unpredictable 
experimentation, where one can explore 
unknown and unexpected ways of thinking, 
talking and doing.” This linkage between 
democracy and experimentation in early child-
hood practice is a central theme of  Dahlberg 
and Bloch, who argue that:
“[T]o construct a community of inquirers 
with an experimental spirit requires listening 
and a radical dialogue. In ‘real’ listening,  
children become partners in a process of 
experimentation and research by inventing 
problems and by listening to and negotiating 
what other children, as well as the teacher, 
are saying and doing. In this process the co-
constructing pedagogue has to open herself/
himself to the unexpected and experiment 
together with the children – in the here-
and-now event. S/he challenges the children 
by augmenting connections through enlarg-
ing the number of concepts, hypotheses and 
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theories, as well as through new material 
and through challenging children’s more 
technical work. Besides getting a responsible 
relation to other children by listening, they 
also are negotiating in between each other, 
enlarging the choices that can be made, 
instead of bringing choice down to universal 
trivialisations.” 
             (Dahlberg and Bloch 2006: 114)
Conditions for democratic 
experimentalism
Understandings
The model of democratic experimentalism 
needs supportive conditions, providing a rich 
environment in which democracy can flourish. 
I have already referred to one of these con-
ditions: a commitment to and support of 
democracy by all levels of government and an 
image or understanding of the early childhood 
institution as a public forum or meeting place. 
Democracy is unlikely to thrive where, for 
example, government prioritises consumer over 
collective choice and early childhood institu-
tions are seen and understood as if they were 
businesses selling commodities and/or factories 
for producing predetermined outcomes. 
But other images or understandings are also 
important for bringing politics into the nursery; 
for example the image of the child, of parents 
and of workers. I have already outlined how 
democratic experimentalism presumes a par-
ticular subject – adult or child – who is socially 
responsible and a rights-bearing citizen. More 
specifically, the child, in the model of demo-
cratic experimentalism, is understood not only 
as a competent citizen, but also as an expert in 
her own life, having opinions that are worth 
listening to; she has the right and competence 
to participate in collective decision-making. 
There is recognition, too, that children (but 
also adults) have, in the words of Malaguzzi, a 
hundred languages in which to express them-
selves15, and that democratic practice means 
being ‘multilingual’. The importance of such 
multilingualism is highlighted by the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
“[Young children] can make choices and 
communicate their feelings, ideas and wishes 
in numerous ways, long before they are able 
to communicate through the conventions of 
spoken or written language” (2005: 7).
Parents in a democratic institution are seen 
as competent citizens “because they have and 
develop their own experience, points of view, 
interpretation and ideas … which are the fruits 
of their experience as parents and citizens” 
(Cagliari, Barozzi and Giudici 2004: 30). 
Last, but not least, workers are understood as 
practitioners of democracy. While recognising 
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that they bring an important perspective and 
a relevant local knowledge to the democratic 
forum, they also understand that they do not 
have the truth nor privileged access to knowl-
edge. As Paulo Freire puts it, the educator may 
offer her ‘reading of the world’, but her role is to 
“bring out the fact that there are other ‘readings 
of the world’” (Freire 2004: 96), at times in 
opposition to her own. This understanding of 
the worker is embodied in what Oberhuemer 
(2005) has termed ‘democratic professionalism’:
“[I]t is a concept based on participatory 
relationships and alliances. It foregrounds 
collaborative, co-operative action between 
professional colleagues and other stakehold-
ers. It emphasises engaging and networking 
with the local community. … [T]here is a 
growing body of literature which questions 
traditional notions of professionalism, 
notions which distance professionals from 
those they serve and prioritise one group’s 
knowledge over another.” 
        (Oberhuemer 2005: 13)
 
Values
Democratic and experimental practice needs cer-
tain values to be shared among the community 
of the early childhood institution, for example:
Respect for diversity, •	 through adopting a 
relational ethics that gives the highest value 
to diversity. Gunilla Dahlberg and I have 
explored such an ethics (Dahlberg and 
Moss 2005). This ‘ethics of an encounter’, 
associated with the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas, starts from Levinas’ challenge to 
a strong Western philosophical tradition 
that gives primacy to knowing and leads us 
to ‘grasp’ the other in our desire to know 
– by ‘grasping’, we make the other into 
the same. An example is developmental 
stages, a system of classification that gives 
adults possibilities to ‘grasp’ (possess and 
comprehend) the child. The ethics of an 
encounter attempts to counter this grasping 
through respect for the absolute alterity of 
the Other, his or her absolute otherness or 
singularity. For example: ‘This is another 
whom I cannot represent and classify into 
my system of categories, whom I cannot 
seek to know by imposing my framework of 
thought and understanding’16. 
Recognition of multiple perspectives and •	
paradigms, acknowledging and welcoming 
that there is more than one answer to 
most questions and that there are many 
ways of viewing and understanding the 
world (the importance of recognising 
paradigmatic difference – for example, 
between positivistic and post-foundational 
paradigms – and the failure to do so in 
many policy documents is discussed further 
in Moss 2007b).
Welcoming curiosity, uncertainty and •	
subjectivity, and the responsibility that they 
require of us. Curiosity and uncertainty 
16 The implications for education are very great: Putting everything one encounters into pre-made categories implies we make the Other  
 into the Same, as everything that does not fit into these categories, which is unfamiliar and not taken-for-granted has to be overcome… 
 To think another whom I cannot grasp is an important shift and it challenges the whole scene of pedagogy (Dahlberg, 2003: 270)
leave us open to complexity, diversity and 
the unpredicted and hinder governing 
through normalisation. Subjectivity calls 
for walking a fine line between “the illusion 
of determining objective decisions, while 
at the same time avoiding the immanent 
possibility of arbitrary subjectivism” 
(Ransom 2003: 475) – or, in Lather’s phrase, 
striving for ‘rigorous subjectivity’, through 
deliberation with others. 
Critical thinking,•	  which is: 
 
“… a matter of introducing a critical attitude 
towards those things that are given to our 
present experience as if they were timeless, 
natural, unquestionable: to stand against 
the maxims of one’s time, against the spirit 
of one’s age, against the current of received 
wisdom. … [It is a matter] of interrupting 
the fluency of the narratives that encode that 
experience and making them stutter.”  
        (Rose 1999: 20). 
An important element of critical thinking, 
of making narratives stutter, is to ensure a 
continuous interrogation of possible meanings: 
questioning, contesting and denaturalising 
influential concepts and ideas – including 
‘democratic experimentalism’. 
The importance of such values for fostering 
democratic practice is captured in these words 
by three pedagogistas from Reggio Emilia, on 
the subject of participation in their municipal 
schools:
“Participation is based on the idea that 
reality is not objective, that culture is a 
constantly evolving product of society, that 
individual knowledge is only partial; and 
that in order to construct a project, every-
one’s point of view is relevant in dialogue 
with those of others, within a framework 
of shared values. The idea of participation 
is founded on these concepts: and in our 
opinion, so, too, is democracy itself.” 
             (Cagliari, Barozzi and Giudici 2004: 29)
Tools
As well as shared understandings and values, 
the practice of democratic experimentalism 
in early childhood institutions needs certain 
material conditions and tools. Of particular 
importance is pedagogical documentation, by 
which practice and learning processes are made 
visible17 and then subject – in relationship with 
others – to critical thought, dialogue, reflection, 
interpretation and, if necessary, democratic 
evaluation and decision-making. So, key fea-
tures are visibility, multiple perspectives and 
the co-construction of meanings (for fuller 
discussions of pedagogical documentation 
see Dahlberg, Moss and Pence 2007; Rinaldi 
2005). Originating in early childhood centres 
in Northern Italy, particularly in the city of 
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17 Visibility can be achieved in many ways: through notes or observation of children’s work, videos or photographs, taped conversations or  
 children’s drawings or constructions in different materials – the possibilities are almost endless.
Reggio Emilia, pedagogical documentation has 
since been taken up in many countries, both in 
Europe and beyond.
Pedagogical documentation has a central role to 
play in many facets of the early childhood insti-
tution: planning pedagogical work; evaluation 
as meaning making; professional development; 
research by children and adults; and ensuring 
that new knowledge created from evaluation, 
professional development and research is 
shared as a common good. Cross-cutting these 
particular uses, is the contribution of pedagogi-
cal documentation to democratic practice in 
the early childhood institution. 
Loris Malaguzzi, one of the great pedagogical 
thinkers of the last century and the first director 
of the early childhood services in Reggio Emilia, 
saw documentation in this democratic light, as 
his biographer Alfredo Hoyuelos writes:
“[Documentation] is one of the keys to 
Malaguzzi’s philosophy. Behind this practice, 
I believe, is the ideological and ethical con-
cept of a transparent school and transparent 
education. … A political idea also emerges, 
which is that what schools do must have 
public visibility. … Documentation in all its 
different forms also represents an extraor-
dinary tool for dialogue, for exchange, for 
sharing. For Malaguzzi it means the possi-
bility to discuss and to dialogue ’everything 
with everyone’ (teachers, auxiliary staff, 
cooks, families, administrators and citizens. 
… [S]haring opinions by means of docu-
mentation presupposes being able to discuss 
real, concrete things – not just theories or 
words, about which it is possible to reach 
easy and naïve agreement.”    
                          (Hoyuelos 2004: 7)
Carlina Rinaldi, Malaguzzi’s successor as director 
of Reggio Emilia’s services, similarly speaks of 
documentation as democratic practice: “Sharing 
the documentation means participation in a 
true act of democracy, sustaining the culture 
and visibility of childhood, both inside and 
outside the school: democratic participation, 
or ‘participant democracy’, that is a product of 
exchange and visibility” (Rinaldi 2005: 59.)
Pedagogical documentation can also be seen 
as providing a form of democratic or public 
accountability, which is very different to a par-
ticular form of ‘neoliberal’ accountability that, 
Ransom argues, has developed in recent years, 
based on the market, contract and inspection. 
This latter regime, he contends, has failed to 
achieve its purposes of institutional achieve-
ment and public trust:
“Achievement grows out of the internal 
goods of motivation to improve (that follows 
recognition and the mutual deliberation of 
purpose) rather than the external imposition 
of quantifiable targets, while public trust 
follows deliberation of common purpose 
out of difference and discord, rather than 
forces of competition. … Trust and achieve-
ment can only merge in a framework of 
public accountability that enables different 
accounts of public purpose and practice 
to be deliberated in a democratic public 
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sphere: constituted to include difference, 
enable participation, voice and dissent, 
through to collective judgement and decision, 
that is in turn accountable to the public.”  
              (Ransom 2003: 476) 
Pedagogical documentation – with the impor-
tance it attaches to different accounts, partici-
pation, deliberation and collective judgement 
– seems well suited to this ideal of public 
accountability, and therefore to the goals of 
institutional achievement and public trust. 
As indicated above, documentation today is 
widely practised in various forms and for 
various purposes. An example with which I am 
particularly familiar is the Mosaic approach 
developed by my colleague Alison Clark to give 
voice to the perspectives of young children. 
This approach uses a variety of methods to 
generate documentation with children: these 
methods include observation, child interviewing, 
photography (by children themselves), and 
tours and mapmaking. The documentation so 
generated is then subject to review, reflection 
and discussion by children and adults – a 
process of interpretation or meaning making. 
Inspired by pedagogical documentation, the 
Mosaic approach has been used for a range of 
purposes, including to understand better how 
children experience life in the nursery (the 
main question being ‘what does it mean to be in 
this place?’) and to enable the participation by 
young children in the design of new buildings 
and outdoor spaces. Here is yet another example 
of how pedagogical documentation is a key tool 
for democratic practice, in this case young 
children’s contribution to decision-making 
(Clark and Moss 2005; Clark 2005).
It is important to keep in mind that pedagogical 
documentation is not child observation; it is 
not, and would never claim to be, a means of 
getting a ‘true’ picture of what children can do 
nor a technology of normalisation, a method 
of assessing a child’s conformity to some 
developmental norm. It does not, for exam-
ple, assume an objective, external truth about 
the child that can be recorded and accurately 
represented. It adopts instead the values of 
subjectivity and multiplicity: it can never be 
neutral, being always perspectival (Dahlberg et 
al. 1999). Understood in this way, as a means for 
exploring and contesting different perspectives, 
pedagogical documentation not only becomes 
a means of resisting power, including dominant 
discourses, but also a means of fostering demo-
cratic and experimental practice.
Educated workers 
Not only does democracy in the ECEC centre 
require workers who are understood, both 
by themselves and others, as practitioners of 
democracy “with a professional obligation to 
create an educational environment which will 
sustain the development of democratic virtues 
and practices” (Carr and Hartnett 1996: 195); 
It also requires a workforce whose initial and 
continuous professional development supports 
them in this role. This includes a capacity to 
work with uncertainty – in Fortunati’s words, 
“removed from the fallacy of certainties” 
(Fortunati 2006: 37) – and to be open to the 
possibility of other perspectives and knowledge.
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Also important is the ability to discuss, exchange, 
reflect and argue – in short to be able to dia-
logue. Dialogue, Paulo Freire says, is the way 
“people achieve significance as human beings. 
… It is an act of creation … [it is] founded 
upon love, humility, and faith” (Freire 1996: 
70); it cannot exist without critical thinking, 
“thinking which perceives reality as process, as 
transformation, rather than as a static entity” 
(p. 73); “it is the opportunity available to me to 
open up to the thinking of others” (Freire 2004: 
103). Carlina Rinaldi shares Freire’s belief in 
the centrality and transformatory potential of 
dialogue. It is, she says, of absolute importance: 
“an idea of dialogue not as an exchange but 
as a process of transformation where you lose 
absolutely the possibility of controlling the final 
result” (Rinaldi 2005: 184). Note Rinaldi’s rejec-
tion here of the ‘exchange paradigm’ and her 
openness to the unpredicted, the unexpected, 
the ungoverned.
An important role in supporting a democratic 
workforce is that of critical friend or mentor, 
for example the pedagogista of northern Italy, 
an experienced educator working with a small 
number of centres to support dialogue, critical 
thought and pedagogical documentation. 
Working in a democratic way with children and 
adults in these centres, especially with pedagog-
ical documentation, the pedagogista can make 
an important contribution to the continuous 
professional development of practitioners of 
democracy and to democratic practice through-
out the nursery. 
Research
Research that supports a model of democratic 
experimentalism needs both to embody the 
values of this model and to provide knowledge 
that can support its implementation. Judged 
against these criteria, much research in ECEC 
is not supportive, adopting instead an instru-
mental rationale, a positivistic paradigm and 
a technical role; the focus has been on expert 
identification of which technologies most effec-
tively produce an assemblage of predetermined 
outcomes. Policy analysis has been dominated 
by this positivistic work, either unaware of or 
ignoring research from other perspectives. This 
dominant research discourse is, I would argue, 
problematic on at least four counts.
First, it falls into the pitfall of ‘scientism’ in 
social science – “understood as the tendency to 
believe that science holds a reliable method of 
reaching the truth about the nature of things” 
(Flyvbjerg 2004: 412). This critique has given rise 
to what has been called the ‘Flyvbjerg Debate’, 
after Bent Flyvbjerg, an urban geographer in 
Denmark, who stimulated the debate with the 
publication of his book Making Social Science 
Matter (Flyvbjerg 2001; Schram and Caterino 
2006). Flyvbjerg, like others before him, calls 
for the social sciences to abandon attempts to 
emulate the natural sciences, arguing that con-
text and the meaning making (interpretation) 
of social actors makes social and natural science 
unavoidably different:
“The natural science approach simply does 
not work in the social sciences. No predictive 
theories have been arrived at in social science, 
56
despite centuries of trying. … Regardless of 
how much we let mathematical and statisti-
cal modelling dominate the social sciences, 
they are unlikely to become scientific in the 
natural science sense. This is because the 
phenomena modelled are social, and thus 
‘answer back’ in ways natural phenomena do 
not. … [I]f the social context cannot be for-
malised in terms of features and rules, then 
social theory cannot be complete and predic-
tive in the manner of much natural science 
theory, which does not have the problem of 
self-interpretive objects of study.”
        (Flyvbjerg 2006: 38–39)
Another way of putting this is to say that life is 
irreducibly complex, singular, unstable, unpre-
dictable and uncertain. It is, in short, messy. 
(Early childhood) education has outcomes, but 
they emerge from interactions, embedded in 
complex contexts, and are necessarily undeter-
minable (Urban 2008: 144). 
Second, this dominant form of research is 
understood and practised in an exclusive 
and exclusionary way, treated as the domain 
of certain experts in the academy and as the 
practice of certain techniques and procedures. 
But research can also be viewed more broadly: 
as a way of thinking and approaching life, in 
which the educator can also be a researcher 
(Rinaldi 2005). Hind broadens the argument 
further, arguing that researching is a task that 
can be undertaken by citizens acting as public 
researchers as a way of reviving Kant’s goal for 
the Enlightenment of an end to intellectual 
tutelage: “I do think, however, that as individu-
als we can assess evidence and information 
with a certain degree of impartiality, and that 
collectively we can pool and synthesise the 
results of our work and thereby come ever 
closer to an adequate description of political 
reality” (Hind 2007: 138). This more inclusive 
view of research would not exclude academics, 
nor ignore their particular expertise; but it 
would include and value the participation of 
others, including educators, parents, children 
and the wider citizenry. I have already men-
tioned one method – pedagogical documenta-
tion – that would enable research to become 
embedded in the everyday life of the nursery or 
school; but there are others.
Third, the concentration of research on a 
narrow approach conducted by a narrow 
class of experts has meant the neglect of a 
more democratic, contextualised and pluralist 
research, which would include inter alia more 
attention paid to understanding and evaluating 
other models of ECEC. Lather (2006) argues that 
critical case studies, strategically chosen, are 
of great importance. These might include, for 
example, experiences (whether governments, 
nurseries or small groups) that have empha-
sised democracy and/or experimentation, 
whether this is a study of a particular institution 
or a particular project or sequence of projects. 
Sharing this line of thinking, Flybvjerg argues 
for a social science that draws on the Aristotelian 
concept of phronesis, a type of practical 
knowledge or wisdom “that comes from an 
intimate familiarity with the contingencies and 
uncertainties of various forms of social practice 
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embedded in complex social settings” (Flyvbjerg 
2001: 8). ‘Phronetic social science’ is aware of 
the inescapability of meaning, perspective and 
context, and concentrates on contributing to 
reflexive analysis and deliberation about values 
and interests: “It is concerned with facilitat-
ing engagement between different points of 
view and the process of learning that occurs as 
the result of such engagement” (Gordon 2007: 
1784). This view of social science is
“ … based on interpretation and is open for 
testing in relation to other interpretations 
and other research. … [It] is dialogical in 
the sense that it incorporates and, if suc-
cessful, is incorporated into a polyphony of 
voices. No one voice, including that of the 
researcher, may claim final authority. The 
aim is to produce input to dialogue and 
praxis in social affairs, rather than to gener-
ate ultimate, unequivocally verified ‘knowl-
edge’. … [T]he purpose of social science 
is not to develop epistemic theory, but to 
contribute to society’s practical rationality 
by elucidating where we are, where we want 
to go, and what is desirable according to dif-
ferent sets of values and interests. The goal 
of the phronetic approach becomes contrib-
uting to society’s capacity for value-rational 
deliberation and action.” 
        (Flyvbjerg 2006: 41–42)
Fourth, the attention given to the technical role 
of research is at the expense of another equally 
important role: the cultural role of research. 
Rather than focusing on means, strategies and 
techniques to achieve given ends (i.e. the tech-
nical role), the cultural role provides different 
ways of understanding and imagining social 
reality. Adopting this role, research: 
“… can also play a valuable role in helping 
educational practitioners to acquire a 
different understanding of their practice, 
in helping them to see and imagine their 
practice differently. … By looking through 
a different theoretical lens, we may also be 
able to understand problems where we did 
not understand them before, or even to see 
problems where we did not see them before 
(think, for example, of the ways in which 
feminist scholarship has helped us precisely 
to make problems visible.”  
     (Biesta 2007: 19) 
Biesta explicitly links the cultural role of 
research to democracy: policy research devoted 
only to technical questions is “a threat to 
democracy itself”, which needs “critical inquiry 
into normative and political questions about 
what is educationally desirable” (p. 21).
The argument is not to banish or denigrate 
technico-instrumental research; we need 
research about means, closely related to 
research about ends (Biesta 2007). The argument 
is about getting such research into perspective, 
viewing it as just one part of a spectrum of 
possibilities, providing a value-based perspective 
and a local knowledge (like all other research), 
and requiring contextualisation and interpreta-
tion. In a model of democratic experimentalism, 
the need is for diversifying research and its 
practice to better reflect diversity of paradigms 
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and perspectives; to view it as an aid to under-
standing, reflection and action, not a prescrip-
tion for action; to recognise that research can 
escape neither context nor the complexities and 
contradictions of existence; and to use it as a 
contribution to democratic deliberation about 
ends and means and possibilities. 
Any model, not least democratic experimental-
ism, requires research to provide understanding 
of processes, evaluation of outcomes (both 
predefined and unpredicted), and a degree 
of ‘democratic accountability’. I agree with 
Lather when she argues for “fuzzying the lines 
between empirical research, politics and the 
philosophical renewal of public deliberation” 
and for applied work “with a critical edge that 
can improve the quality of practice by taking 
into account complexity and the messiness of 
practice-in-context” (Lather 2006: 788, 789). 
ECEC that is based on democratic experimen-
talism requires commensurate research.
Time
Before finishing this discussion, I want to flag 
up what is both a major issue and one that is 
particularly difficult to get to grips with: time. 
Democratic experimentalism in ECEC services, 
indeed anywhere (including schools), calls for 
active participation and deliberation. It is far 
more demanding than democracy reduced 
to occasional voting by adults, and one of its 
demands is time, which is in short supply today 
when we are so unceasingly busy. 
A strange feature of English policy in early 
childhood and compulsory schooling, perhaps 
too in some other countries, is the emphasis 
given today to ‘parental involvement’ when 
parents appear to be busier than ever. So on 
the one hand, policy values employment for 
fathers and mothers; while at the same time, 
policy values parents being involved in their 
children’s education, as well as endlessly (and 
rather tritely) emphasising their role as ‘first’ 
educators. There is an interesting tension here 
– though less so than might at first appear, as 
involvement is primarily understood in policy 
terms as parents reinforcing taken-for-granted 
educational objectives and targets (parents-as-
assistants): involvement, understood as critical 
democratic participation (parents-as-citizens), 
is likely to make more demands on time. 
Far more thought needs to be given to the 
question of time, and how we might be able to 
redistribute it across a range of activities and 
relationships, in particular to enable parents to 
participate in a democratic and experimental 
early childhood institution without having to 
forego participation in paid employment. White 
argues that the demand for the time needed 
for democracy creates “a possible tension with 
the market, which is also generally hungry for 
people’s time and energy” (White 2008: 20). He 
argues for government limiting working hours 
in the interest of advancing active citizenship. 
Beck proposes the concept of ‘public work’ that 
would provide “a new focus of activity and iden-
tity that will revitalise the democratic way of 
life” (Beck 1998: 60) and  suggests various ways 
of paying for public work. Unger also identifies 
the need for bridging the gap between the 
‘production system’ and the ‘caring economy’:
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“It is fundamentally important that every 
able-bodied adult should have a position in 
both the production system and the caring 
economy. … We have to try different things. 
It can be weekend work. It can be a month in 
the year. It can be two years in everyone’s life.” 
              (Unger 2005b: 180)
While Unger here is envisaging a changing 
relationship for the whole population, the need 
to enable parents, who are already carers, to 
have time to participate in ECEC services (and 
schools) can be subsumed into this discussion. 
This might be facilitated by his proposal “to 
fashion legal arrangements that facilitate the 
division of work time between the production 
system and the caring economy” (Unger 2004: 
xcviii). One possibility involves moving away 
from current ‘parental leave’ policies, narrowly 
defined as enabling mothers and fathers to 
have more time to care for very young children 
or care temporarily for children who are ill; 
and turning towards a far broader ‘time credit’ 
policy, giving citizens the right to a certain 
amount of paid leave over a working lifetime, to 
use for a variety of purposes, including partici-
pation in children’s services (a unique example 
of a national ‘time credit’ policy can be found 
in Belgium; for more information see Fusulier, 
forthcoming 2009).
Any policies intended to increase the time avail-
able to parents for participation in ECEC (or 
school) services needs to be genuinely ‘paren-
tal’; that is, it needs to be designed to enable 
and encourage use by fathers and mothers, to 
be monitored to ensure use by both, and 
re-designed if the monitoring proves it is inef-
fective – for mothers or fathers or both parents. 
Otherwise it will fall into the pitfall of so many 
policies aimed at parents, simply reinforcing 
women’s perceived and actual primary respon-
sibility for young children and contributing to 
the maintenance of gender inequality. (For a 
discussion of designing parental leave policies 
to support use by fathers, a related issue, see 
Moss 2008b).
Nor is the need for time confined to parents. 
Workers in ECEC services need space in their 
working lives to devote to documentation and 
dialogue, not just to prepare future work but to 
be able to reflect upon, interpret, exchange and 
evaluate current practice. 
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What implications do these different models 
have for the way ECEC systems are structured, 
in particular access, type of service, management, 
workforce and funding? 
Under the market model, services provide a 
specific and specified product to consumers 
who are willing and able to pay: most commonly, 
‘childcare for working parents’. Access, there-
fore, is determined by consumer need and 
purchasing power and is likely to be mainly to 
single function specialist services, for example 
nurseries supplying ‘childcare’ for children of 
working parents. These services are managed 
by their owners, who respond to consumer 
demand and to the need to make a return on 
capital, though this may be mediated by the 
extent of government regulation and the system 
in place for ensuring compliance. The workforce 
is viewed, first and foremost, as technicians, 
delivering prescribed technologies to achieve 
prescribed outcomes, with earnings set at a level 
that ensures ‘affordability’ for consumers and a 
profit for owners. Funding relies mainly on fees, 
paid by parents-as-consumers, supplemented by 
demand-side subsidies paid in some form (e.g. 
tax credits, vouchers) to lower-income parents.
In the democratic experimental model, access is 
an entitlement of citizenship and is to a multi-
purpose service, a children’s centre, which is 
a multi-purpose public institution capable 
of many projects and open to all families in 
the local community, irrespective of parental 
employment status. Publicly funded services are 
provided by a range of public and private sector 
organisations, the main condition being a will-
ingness to be experimental and democratic, as 
well as conforming to the common conditions 
specified in the national framework of entitle-
ments, standards and objectives (which would 
include, inter alia, a common policy on parental 
fees, staff qualifications and pay). ‘Democratic’ 
in this context means adopting a participatory 
approach, broadly defined, including everyday 
relationships and practices as well as more 
formal involvement of children and adults in 
decision-making, evaluation and other activi-
ties. FP providers are not, therefore, excluded 
on principle, but have to find ways of reconcil-
ing business imperatives with democratic and 
experimental practice and the national frame-
work of standards and entitlements. 
Services work within the democratically agreed 
national framework, which leaves substantial 
scope for local and institutional interpretation 
and additional goals. Oversight is supplied 
through the democratic participation of children 
and adults, including the use of pedagogical 
documentation as an evaluative tool, and 
through the close involvement of pedagogistas. 
Municipal politicians are expected to partici-
pate in documentation, so gaining first-hand 
knowledge of the services for which they are 
responsible, rather than relying simply on 
Chapter 3: Comparing ECEC systems under the different 
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reports or ‘quality’ evaluations from managers 
or inspectors; indeed, a major goal of democratic 
experimentalism is to connect democratic 
services with the formal structures of local 
democracy. Services that caused sustained 
concern and proved unable to reform would be 
closed – but only as a last resort and after much 
collaborative work.
The workforce is viewed as reflective democratic 
professionals, whose initial and continuing pro-
fessional development equips them to create, 
sustain and work in a democratic and experi-
mental milieu. A strong emphasis is placed 
on qualities such as dialogue, research, border 
crossing, and critical thinking, and on valuing 
complexity, diversity and uncertainty. There is 
parity of qualification, pay and other conditions 
with other similar professionals, for example 
school teachers. 
Lastly, there is supply-side funding, with services 
directly supported with public money. The 
OECD Starting strong review outlines a number 
of practical problems with demand subsidy 
funding systems, typical of market models, 
including underfunding, weakened government 
capacity to steer services, and the possibility 
parent subsidies may not be used efficiently 
on behalf of children (OECD 2006: 116–117). 
But the argument for supply-side funding goes 
further and deeper: that this is the proper form 
of funding for key public institutions, serving 
no single consumer group and purpose but a 
community and a variety of citizens – children, 
parents, the wider community – and purposes. 
Subsidising parents makes sense if early child-
hood services are treated simply as businesses 
selling a commodity to a consumer in a market, 
the consumer-parent being regarded as respon-
sible for his or her child; it makes no sense if 
these services are treated as places of encounter 
and collaborative workshops, public spaces that 
are the expression of a responsibility for children 
that the public shares with parents. 
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No model of service delivery can ever offer the 
one right and objectively best way; nor will any 
model function anything like perfectly, even 
in its own terms, once put to work. Models are 
born in particular contexts and reflect particu-
lar views about how the world is and should be; 
they are local in origin and political in nature. 
Ultimately they always fail to encompass the 
complexities and the contradictions of the 
world. They also become dated, as the taken-
for-granted dominant discourse at one point of 
time seems to be irretrievably outmoded and 
strange at another. 
Yet despite these qualifications, the models 
outlined here – but also others not covered – 
do offer us, as societies and individual citizens, 
real and important collective choices that need 
to be addressed and decided upon through 
democratic politics. Deciding between models 
matters; so, too, do the deliberations, dialogues 
and disagreements that produce the decision. 
A healthy democracy needs the energy and 
stimulation of decisions that matter, decisions 
that ask us to consider who we are, what matters 
to us here and now and in the future, and what 
we want our societies to be.
Perhaps then the first conclusion to be drawn is 
the need for democratic societies to value and 
nurture utopian thought, to support the articu-
lation and discussion of alternative directions, 
and to promote experimentation exploring how 
these different directions might be followed. 
This is not to say that democratically elected 
governments should surrender all claims to 
determine the broad direction of policy; I have 
argued the need for clear and strong national 
frameworks. It is to say though that they should 
recognise the existence of alternatives and leave 
room for discussion, research, experimentation 
and evaluation of some (at least) of the alterna-
tives. As well as arguments based on diversity 
and democracy, there is also a certain expedient 
case for not putting all policy and practice eggs 
in one basket.
Yet all too often, policy documents by govern-
ments and international organisations reduce 
alternatives to small points of policy detail, 
ignoring the need to recognise different para-
digms and perspectives, different directions 
and models and to argue the case for one over 
others. The UK Government, for example, did 
not set out alternatives for the future direction 
of ECEC services in England, then argue the 
case for its preferred direction; it simply chose 
and pursued a market model. Pilot projects, too, 
are often synonymous with how to implement 
one approach, rather than encouraging diverse 
experimental cultural projects of childhood.
A second conclusion concerns the relationship 
between models. It is perhaps unavoidable in 
papers of this kind to present different models, 
approaches or methods as clear-cut and oppo-
sitional binaries: model A is like this, model B 
like that and never the twain shall meet. But in 
practice things are usually messier. A model can 
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be applied in a variety of forms, and there are 
examples in the real world where distinctions 
blur and black/white differences on paper look 
greyer in reality; while democracy involves an 
element of negotiation and compromise – or at 
least finding some common ground. 
Are markets and democratic experimentation 
wholly incompatible? Unger argues for democ-
racy, experimentalism – and markets and 
competition, though with strong qualifications: 
“The quarrel of the left cannot be with the 
market … [but] the left must deny the natural 
and necessary character of the existing form 
of the market. … The basic impulse of the left 
should be: markets yes, free civil society yes, 
representative democracy yes” (Unger 2005b: 
178). He sees an important role for private 
providers, as “the organisation of co-operative 
activity among small and medium-sized pro-
ducers who also compete with one another” 
(Unger 2002: lxxxvii). 
While he argues for the role of markets, but in a 
particular context, and for the contribution of 
private provider, again in a conditional way, he 
also offers an original prescription for the role 
of government and is critical of crude priva-
tisation. He rejects the idea that government 
should simply privatise service provision, being 
reduced to regulating the activities of profit-
driven providers of services within a market 
model: “Europeans should refuse to choose 
between mass provision of low quality, stand-
ardised service by governmental bureaucracies 
and the profit-driven privatisation of public 
service” (Unger 2007: 80). Instead government 
should actively help to “produce new social 
agents who can provide those services com-
petitively and differentially in a form which is 
both customised and innovative” (Unger 2005a: 
179), encouraging and supporting experimental 
provision and, in his term, democratising the 
market. Further, it should monitor and propa-
gate the most successful experiments. 
But, government has another role. It should 
also provide services itself and not merely as 
a residual provider of last resort: “The state 
provides directly only those services which are 
too innovative, too difficult or too unrewarded 
by the market to be provided directly … direct 
provision of social services becomes the ceiling, 
not the floor” (Unger 2005a: 179). Elsewhere he 
argues for the government to act as “a vanguard” 
in the provision of public services, “developing 
experimentally new services or new ways of pro-
viding old services” (Unger 2005b: 86). Although 
Unger offers no examples himself, the role 
played by the municipal government in Reggio 
Emilia immediately springs to mind.
The role Unger envisages for the market, there-
fore, is substantially qualified, and is far from 
the market model of neoliberalism; indeed, he 
is very aware of the many forms that market 
economies can assume and particularly critical 
of that form that has come to be dominant in 
‘the North Atlantic World’. He wants to find 
ways of combining co-operation and compe-
tition; to diversify the supply side, including 
public providers and a wide range of non-profit 
private organisations; and to situate the market 
in a democratic context. It is not enough, he 
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says, to regulate the market, it needs to be rede-
fined. The guiding principle is not consumer 
choice but “experimental diversification on 
the basis of a loose set of associations between 
government and non-government initiatives” 
(Unger 2005b: 87).
Unger here holds out the possibility of some 
form of reconciliation between markets and 
democracy, a possibility meriting further 
research and discussion. Others, however, argue 
a fundamental contradiction. For example, Carr 
and Hartnett (1996), with whose comment I 
began this paper, are unwavering: “Any vision 
of education that takes democracy seriously 
cannot but be at odds with educational reforms 
which espouse the language and values of 
market forces.” So too is Apple (2005): “Public 
institutions are the defining features of a caring 
and democratic society. … [M]arkets are to be 
subordinate to the aim of producing a fuller 
and thicker participatory democratic polity and 
daily life” (Apple 2005: 18).
Perhaps an element of competition, de jure or 
de facto, is inevitable, unless a service system 
runs on the basis of random allocation of chil-
dren to ECEC services, removing any element 
of parents’ (or children’s) say in the matter 
– an unlikely prospect in a liberal democracy. 
Competition may also occur between different 
experimental projects, even if it is the non-
commercial competition of researchers anxious 
to make the most original and exciting discov-
eries or seeking to be the first to achieve some 
common goal. But having acknowledged com-
petition may figure in both models, like choice, 
another term held in common, the meaning of 
the term is very different.
There is, I think, a difference between compe-
tition as a predominant value and acting as a 
method of discipline to the point of some 
‘suppliers’ going under; and competition as 
good-natured rivalry and friendly comparison 
in a system that prioritises values of collabora-
tion and support. A system based on survival 
of the fittest differs qualitatively from a system 
based on the collective strength of networks. 
Even in the latter system some children and 
parents will choose to use different services 
than the majority in their community, perhaps 
because they are drawn to another direction or 
form of experimentation. But services working 
with democratic experimentalism should be 
responsive enough to their local communities 
and participatory enough in their working 
practices to ensure that most families act on 
what most families now say: that what they 
really want is a ‘good’ local service, not market 
choice – only in this case with most families 
being actively engaged in creating and evaluating 
a collective view of ‘good’. 
There is, then, a world of difference between a 
system which takes competition and individual 
choice as central values; and one that recognises 
them as having some motivational power, but 
does not accord them pride of place and seeks 
to domesticate and direct them in the interests 
of democracy and experimentation.
Finally, while the market model undoubtedly 
has momentum at present, impelled in large 
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part by the rise of neoliberalism over the last 
generation, it is important to resist an over-
determined approach, which can lead to a false 
sense of inevitability and hopelessness, Unger’s 
“dictatorship of no alternatives” (Unger 2005b: 
1). Times – and the zeitgeist – change. What 
seems necessary and inevitable at one time 
can become yesterday’s story very quickly, just 
as ideas considered far out to one generation 
become the next generation’s common sense. 
More fundamentally, we should beware of 
ceding hegemony and necessity to any one idea 
or way of doing things; neoliberalism and its 
concept of markets are certainly important, and 
we should recognise their influence on ECEC 
policies and practices. But they are not universal 
and alternatives do exist. Gibson-Graham’s 
critique of the centrality of capitalism in eco-
nomics – what they term ‘capitalocentric’ think-
ing – could usefully be adapted and applied as a 
corrective in ECEC and schooling:
“Yet while there exists a substantial under-
standing of the extent and nature of eco-
nomic difference, what does not exist is a 
way of convening this knowledge to destabi-
lise the received wisdom of capitalist domi-
nance and unleash the creative forces and 
subjects of economic experimentation. Our 
intervention has been to propose a language 
of the diverse economy as an exploratory 
practice of thinking economy differently in 
order to perform different economies. The 
language of the diverse economy widens the 
identity of the economy to include all of 
those practices excluded or marginalised 
by the theory and presumption of capitalist 
hegemony.” 
             (Gibson-Graham 2006: xi-xii)
Gibson-Graham call their intervention in 
debates about capitalism a ‘politics of language’, 
and this paper might be seen in the same 
light; as an exercise in developing new, richer 
local languages of ECEC and ECEC possibility. 
Although I have only explored two models, and 
‘convened’ only one example of difference to 
the market model, I have tried to indicate the 
potential scope for diversity and experimenta-
tion, as well as pointing to just a few examples 
of practices that risk being excluded or margin-
alised by the theory and presumption of market 
thinking.
The market model leads to a well-known 
destination; in today’s neoliberal climate, this 
destination is widely publicised and the direc-
tion clearly signposted. The other destination 
reported on in this paper, democratic experi-
mentalism, is harder to find and ignored by 
many, but offers great possibilities. In my view, 
we need to learn about and from the scattered 
communities and projects that have already 
made the journey and are practising democratic 
experimentalism in some form, and about the 
directions that need to be taken to get to this 
destination. That way we can develop not only 
a politics of language, but also what Gibson-
Graham terms a ‘politics of collective action’, 
working collaboratively to produce alternative 
organisations, spaces and practices. 
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